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I. Introduction 
 
Over two full decades of 1980s and 1990s the severe debt crisis stalled the development 
process of many low-income countries (LICs). With the failure of the earlier debt 
restructuring attempts through the Paris Club negotiations, the HIPC Initiatives in 1996 and 
1999 searched for a durable exit option from the prolonged debt overhang condition through 
a substantial reduction in official debt, covering both bilateral and multilateral debt. However, 
the resolution of the protracted debt crisis had to wait for a comprehensive debt cancellation 
embedded in the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. 
 
Given this disturbing history of dealing with LICS‘ debt crisis ex-post over the prolonged 
period, the International Financial Institutions (IMF/World Bank) proposed in 2004 the Debt 
Sustainability Framework (DSF) for LICs as a basis for ensuring better debt management ex-
ante to prevent the re-emergence of debt distress and crises through more informed 
borrowing and lending decisions. In contrast to the debt sustainability analysis carried out 
under the HIPC initiatives, which used backward-looking three-year averages, the new DSF 
is seen as a ―forward-looking‖ analysis with its focus on the future path of relevant debt-
burden indicators over a 20 year period. It has been presented: (a) as an analytical tool to 
assess potential debt-related vulnerabilities; and (b) as an operational tool that helps the 
design of a borrowing/leaning path by sovereign borrowers as well as by lending institutions 
and creditor governments (IMF-IDA 2004). 
 
Since then, the DSF was approved by the Boards of the IFIs in 2005 as an official toolkit not 
only for their recommendation on a borrowing/lending strategy to LICs but also for the IDA 
allocation, including its decision regarding the grant-loan mix. The DSF is now widely used 
by other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and export credit agencies as well as some 
of bilateral donor governments in making decisions regarding their aid allocation and lending 
policy towards LICs. Further, IDA developed a non-concessional borrowing policy (NCBP) 
in 2006 with a view to preventing the accumulation of new debts on non-concessional terms, 
since the development of such conditions is seen to: i) undermine the overriding objective of 
the MDRI, i.e. to bring down their debt to sustainable levels and create fiscal space for 
growth and poverty reduction; and ii) allow the risk of free-riding by third party lenders on 
non-concessional terms.  Similarly, the IMF reviewed its external debt limit policy in 2009.  
Following the lead by the IFIs, the African Development Bank (AfDB) adopted its own non-
concessional borrowing policy in 2008, in order to discourage unchecked non-concessional 
debt accumulation by applying compliance measures, including volume discounts and 
hardening of borrowing terms of ADF loans and enhancing creditor coordination around the 
joint IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework.  
 
Thus, the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) applied to individual countries embedded in 
the DSF occupies a central place in all sovereign borrowing/lending decisions taken with 
respect to LICS. Yet, since the release of the original version, the DSF has been subject to 
criticisms by external experts and NGOs. In responding to some of these criticisms, several 
modifications, mostly of minor nature, were made in 2006 and 2009, while raising a number 
of technical issues related to the existing DSF with request for further reworking in several 
aspects of the DSF. Among other issues raised, the DSF and the DSA exercises as conducted 
till recently are particularly criticised as inadequate for capturing the critical relationship 
between public investment and growth, thus restricting the potential financing of Africa‘s 
development needs with debt instruments.   
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Hence, the review of the DSF carried out in 2011 (IMF/World Bank, 2012) with the aim of 
assessing whether the DSF remains adequate in light of changing circumstances in LICs, 
recognized, along with the needs to strengthen the analysis of total public debt and fiscal 
vulnerabilities, that the link between debt-financed investment and growth is integral to the 
quality of DSAs, and models used should better capture the investment-growth linkages. In 
the light of the new official guideline issued subsequently, the DSA exercises conducted 
since then include some discussions of investment-growth linkages, using an open-economy 
Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model developed at the IMF (Buffie et.al, 2011).  
Indeed, the importance of assessing the DSF as a focal framework for examining debt 
dynamics and sustainability in relation to the complex interrelationships in the debt-
investment-growth nexus is widely acknowledged.   
 
This is particularly so because the huge infrastructure gap is increasingly accepted as acting 
as a critical constraint for furthering Africa‘s economic development. Africa‘s current 
infrastructure financing requirements is estimated to be at US$93 billion or about 15 per cent 
of Africa‘s GDP annually. Yet, only about a half of this amount is presently available for 
infrastructure investment from various domestic and external sources combined. Africa‘s 
funding gap for economic infrastructure needs alone is therefore far exceeds what traditional 
donors and regional and multilateral development banks can provide LICs through 
conventional concessional lending windows.  Hence, accessing funds offered on non-
concessional terms, including those from emerging partners as well as from international 
capital market and financial institutions has become an attractive option for a number of LICs 
in the African region.  Since, if properly structured, debt instruments can be an appropriate 
vehicle for infrastructure financing and development financing at large, growing requests 
from its member counties for more flexibility in non-concessional borrowing policy deserve 
careful evaluation and consideration by the IFIs and regional MDBs.  In this regards, it is of 
paramount importance to find ways to strike the right balance between the policy objectives 
of debt sustainability and financing for development. 
 
Given this background and specifically recognizing the opportunities and the needs of its 
regional member countries, the following three specific objectives are set out to achieve by 
this study commissioned by the African Development Bank: 
i) Evaluate critically the Joint World Bank and IMF Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) 
for LICs as currently constructed and used, in particular its methodological approaches and 
analytical framework;  
ii) Define concrete suggestions to allow African low-income countries to receive a higher 
level of non-concessional resources to finance their development, without compromising 
their debt sustainability and with paying due regard to countries‘ absorptive capacity.  
iii) Analyze how the Bank could increase its provision of non-concessional resources to LICs 
without compromising its AAA credit ratings.  
 
Towards these objectives, the rest of the paper is structures as follows.  The first two sections 
(Section II and Section III) present a critical evaluation of the DSF, in particular its 
methodological approaches and analytical framework in two components. These correspond 
to the DSF‘s two building blocks as originally designed (IMF/WB, 2004) and retained 
subsequently (Barkbu et.al. 2008 and IMF/WB, 2012), which are : (i) setting indicative 
country-specific debt-burden thresholds in relation to the quality of the country‘s policies and 
institutions, i.e. the CPIA scores; and (ii) conducting the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
for each country, i.e. an analysis and interpretation of actual and projected debt-burden 
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indicators under a baseline scenario, alternative scenarios, and standardised stress test 
scenarios in the face of plausible shocks.  
 
Hence, in Section II, we examine critically the analytical and empirical basis on which the 
debt-burden thresholds are determined. In questioning the legitimacy of applying the CPIA 
rating as an exclusive screening device for establishing debt burden thresholds for a country 
specific DSA, we suggest alternative approaches to establishing debt burden thresholds. The 
Section III examines the methodological issues involved in the DSA for each country by 
evaluating how ‗forward-looking‘ projections of key debt burden indicators over the 20-year 
period are made and how robust they are to be used as a key yardstick for deciding on 
―permissible‖ level of debt for financing economic development. As the recent Review 
(IMF/World Bank, 2012) recommended a number of important refinements and revisions to 
the ways the DSAs are conducted in future, we examine these refinements, including the 
attempts to incorporate an analysis of the debt-investment-growth nexus into the DSAs with 
application of the DGE model mentioned above.   
 
In Section IV,  we review debt profile of  African LICs in light of the current implementation 
of the LIC-DSF as reflected in the DSAs and debt profile of African LICs, including the 
types and terms of loans contracted and their implication for sustainability . We also examine 
the extent to which African countries have so far accessed non-concessional resources. We 
then revisit the debt-investment-growth nexus in a historical African LIC context from a 
comparative perspective with East Asia, where productive investment has been deployed for 
structural transformation of their economies.  
 
In Section V, we discuss a number of Policy Implications from our analyses. 
First, we evaluate the extent to which the current implementation of the LIC-DSF is a binding 
constraint for utilizing fully potentially available all debt instruments to finance development 
and fill the infrastructure gaps. We discuss the potential use of DSAs as a monitoring 
mechanism for prudent sovereign debt management.  Our critical evaluation of the DSF 
reveals that there is still considerable room for improvements, especially in terms of 
determining the debt burden thresholds.  In future, once the DSF is further refined in several 
key technical aspects, flexible applications of the DSAs would provide us with one of tool 
kits for: a) monitoring debt burden profiles; b) conducting meaningful dialogues between 
borrowers and lenders; and c) making some informed decisions on new borrowing and 
lending.  
 
However, we argue strongly that any decisions guided by DSA exercises on their own would 
not guarantee that debt can be made more sustainable.
1
 Rather, these projections should be 
treated purely as an ―indicative guide‖ for prudent debt management.  This caveat is crucial 
because one of the fundamental weaknesses of the DSF as a framework designed to eschew 
recurrences of debt crises of LICs is the absence of any work-out mechanism of dealing with 
downside risks, i.e. debt vulnerability of these LICs in face of large external shocks.  In this 
context, it is necessary to engage in discussions how to make debt sustainable in the light of 
specific features of debt-growth dynamics of LICs that impact their development processes 
beyond the simple use of toolkits such as the DSF currently in operation.  In view of this, we 
                                                 
1 . Barkbu et.al (2008: 3) offers a broad definition of sustainability, suggesting that debt is sustainable when a borrower is 
expected to be able to continue servicing its debt without an unrealistically large correction to its income and expenditure. 
Wypotsz (2007) notes that the definition adopted by the IMF requires much more strict conditions than other technical 
definitions of ―solvency conditions‖ found in literatures (e.g. Eaton, 1993).  See Wyplosz (2007) for further discussion on 
different definitions of debt sustainability.  
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present the rationale for, and a design of our proposal of, establishing a new contingent 
facility embedded ex ante in more efficient, incentive-compatible aid and sovereign debt 
contracts.  Finally, we discusses various options are available for the African Development 
Bank as a premier development finance institution of the region in providing more flexible 
facilities and instruments. 
 
II. Critical Appraisal of the CPIA-centred System of Aid Allocation and Establishing 
Debt Burden Thresholds   
II.1.The Current Approach 
 
In the LIC-DSF, sovereign debt distress risk is assessed against policy-dependent external 
debt-burden thresholds. This decision is based on the empirical analysis carried out by Kraay 
and Nehru (2004 and 2006) at the World Bank, the results of which were subsequently 
corroborated by a similar analysis carried out by the IMF team (IMF/IDA, 2004a and 2005). 
In particular, it rests entirely on their ―main finding‖, which is claimed to be robust 
irrespective of model specifications and data sets used, that the debt levels LICs can sustain 
are influenced by the quality of their policies and institutions as measured by the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, compiled annually by the World Bank.  
For example, Kraay and Nehru suggest that countries operating in a weak policy environment 
(25
th
 percentile of the CPIA) have the same risk of distress as do countries with strong 
policies (75
th
 percentile) at debt ratios that are lower by about 30 percent of GDP, 200 percent 
of exports, and 100 percent of revenues, including grants.  
 
Taking this empirical evidence as a rationale, the DSF classifies the LICs into three policy 
performance categories according to the CPIA rating: strong (CPIA ≥ 3.75), medium 
(3.25<CPIA<3.75), and Poor (CPIA ≤ 3.25), and uses different indicative thresholds for debt 
burdens for each category, shown in Table 1 below. All debt burden ratios calculated in the 
DSA for LICs use the present value (PV) of debt as a nominator on ground that it can account 
better for the concessionality of debt and allows for a slower pace for contribution of debt-
creating flows to output and export growth.
2
 In order to reduce volatility of aid flows from 
switches in annual CPIA ratings, the three-year moving average CPIA score is now used to 
determine a country‘s policy performance in the DSA. It is assumed that countries with weak 
policies and institutions (i.e. with a low CPIA rating) would face a repayment problem at the 
lower level of debt burden than countries with a higher CPIA rating (IMF-IDA 2005). 
 
Table 1. Debt Burden Thresholds under the DSF 
 
 NPV of debt in percent of Debt service in percent of 
 Exports GDP Revenue Exports Revenue 
Weak Policy 
(CPIA≤  3.25) 
100 30 200 15 25 
Medium Policy 
(3.25<CPIA<3.75) 
150 40 250 20 30 
Strong Policy 
(CPIA≥ 3.75) 
200 50 300 25 35 
                                                 
2
 . The PV is the discounted sum of all future principal and interest at a given discount rate. There has been a debate over 
which discount rate is appropriate for use and when the discount rate should be changed. We shall address these issues in 
Section III below.   
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Sources: World Bank and IMF Website 
 
Further, the debt stress burden threshold applied for each country depending on the CPIA 
score is used for determining the mix of grant-loan allocation by many multilateral 
development institutions as well as bilateral governments. For example, the International 
Development Association (IDA) uses a ―Traffic Light‖ System since the time of the IDA 14 
Replenishment, under which a country is assigned one of three categories of warning signal 
depending on the degree of debt distress as determined by its DSA against its specific 
thresholds.  According to the system, the risk ratings are translated into traffic lights: red, 
yellow or green, depending on the distance to thresholds. A country in debt distress or at a 
high risk would be assigned a red traffic light and receives 100 percent of the IDA allocation 
in grants, a country with a moderate risk- a yellow light with 50 percent in grants, while a 
country with a low risk, assigned a green light receiving 100 percent in loans. Further, in 
order to eschew moral hazard problems, 20 percent discount is applied on grants upfront. 
Consequently, the volume of available financing is reduced by 10 percent for yellow-light 
countries and 20 percent for red-light countries. That is, this allocation method actually 
penalises severely countries with a lower CPIA rating, which are doomed to be high risk.  
 
Despite fundamental criticisms abound, the basic principle underlining the system of 
determining the debt burden thresholds is kept largely intact in the recent official review, 
claiming that the system has served its purpose well (IMF/World Bank, 2012).
3
  However, we 
assess that the arguments and methods used for determining debt burden thresholds in DSF 
cannot withstand critical scrutiny due to several methodological and fundamental issues. In 
the rest of this section, we shall first evaluate two main aspects of the procedures currently 
used to determine debt burden thresholds: i) the use of the CPIA for assessing as a country‘s 
performance rating as well as for determining debt burden thresholds (Section II. 2); ii) 
robustness of the empirical analyses used for justification of the DSF (Section II..3). Then, in 
the final sub-section (Section II.4), we shall present alternative approaches to establishing 
debt burden thresholds and aid allocation, including the grants-loan mix. 
II.2. Critical review of the CPIA and the Performance Based Allocation 
 
There is no disagreement in general terms that a country‘s policy and institutional 
environments affect significantly its debt carrying capacity and likelihood of debt distress. 
However, a serious concern can be raised over the legitimacy of the use of the CPIA for 
measuring and rating the quality of institutions and policies of LICs for aid allocation, 
including for determining the debt burden thresholds and the grant-loan allocation in the DSF 
(Kanbur 2005 and Nissanke 2010a). The CPIA comprise of 16 criteria grouped into four 
equally weighted clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for 
social inclusion and equity; and (iv)  public sector management and institutions, as shown in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: 2004 Criteria included in CPIA 
                                                 
3
 . The Review recommended modest revisions to the thresholds for debt service to revenue and for the PV of debt to the 
sum of exports and remittances. 
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A. Economic management 
 1. Macroeconomic management 
 2.  Fiscal policy 
 3.  Debt policy 
B. Structural policies  
 4.  Trade  
 5.  Financial sector  
 6.  Business regulatory environment  
C. Policies for social inclusion/equity 
 7.  Gender equality 
 8.  Equity of public resource use 
 9.  Building human resources 
 10.  Social protection and labour 
 11. Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability 
D. Public sector management and institutions 
 12.  Property rights and rule-based governance 
 13.  Quality of budgetary and financial management 
 14.  Efficiency of revenue mobilization 
 15. Quality of public administration 
 16.  Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public 
sector 
Source: World Bank (2005a) Box 2, Annex 1 p.45 
 
In IDA-14 allocation, for example, the country performance ratings (CPR) is arrived at by 
first constructing the composite index, wherein the CPIA is given 80 per cent weight with 20 
per cent weight allocated to the portfolio performance ratings (PORT). The latter is derived 
from the Bank‘s Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP) for reflecting the 
percentage of IDA-funded project at risk in a country. The composite index is further 
moderated by a governance factor (GOV), which is made up of six criteria: five are drawn 
from Cluster D of the CPIA rating (measuring public sector management and institutions as 
shown in Table 2 and one from the ARPP (World Bank 2005a, IDA 2007 a & b).
4
 Thus, the 
process of determining CPR is illustrated in the Bank‘s documentation as Figure 1-a.  
 
                                                 
4 The CPIA, portfolio performance ratings and governance factor were publicly disclosed only in 2007. 
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Figure 1.a  IDA Country Performance Rating under IDA 14 
 
 
Fig.1.b   The PBA Formula Under IDA 15 
 
 
 
The actual formula used to determine CPR in IDA-14 is: 
 
Country performance rating = (0.8 * CPIA + 0.2 * PORT) *(Gov/3.5)
1.5 
 
Country Policy 
and Institutional 
Assessment 
(CPIA) 
5 Governance 
related indicators 
from CPIA 
Governance 
Factor 
Weighted 
Average 
Portfolio 
Performance Rating 
(from ARPP) 
1 Governance 
related indicator 
from ARPP 
IDA Country Performance Rating 
80% 20% 
Source: IDA (2007, Chart 1 in p.2) 
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The governance rating is divided by 3.5, which is the mid-point of the CPIA scale, and then 
raised to an exponent of 1.5. This means that for governance scores above 3.5, the rating is 
increased while for scores below 3.5, it is decreased. Finally, IDA annual allocation received 
by each country is determined according to the following formula: 
 
IDA Country allocation per annum = base allocation + f (Country performance rating
2.0
, 
Population
1.0
, GNI/capita
-0.125
) 
 
Thus, in IDA-14, IDA country allocation, addition to the base allocation of SDR 1.1 million 
per annum to all IDA-eligible countries, is a function of CPR as defined above, the 
population size, and a country‘s needs reflected in per capita GNI.5 Clearly, these 
mechanisms and formulae make the CPIA the dominant factor in the IDA allocation, while 
variables such as population (POP) and gross national income per capita (GNIPC) are merely 
a moderating factor. This led the World Bank to confirm that ‗there is a modest bias in favour 
of the IDA eligible countries with a lower GNI per capita‘ (World Bank 2005a: Annex 4). 
Hence, as Kanbur (2005: 5) notes, ―the performance rating has a much higher weight than the 
measure of the need‘ where ‗the need‘ is captured by the income criterion‖. In short, ―aid 
productivity‘ is given precedence over the ‗need‘ in the donor‘s impact analysis‖ (ibid: 11).  
 
Similar ‗rule-based‘ methods are adopted for allocating highly concessional resources at both 
the Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank (IDA 2007a).
6
 As noted above, 
since the DSA within the DSF is conducted in parallel with the IDA aid allocation, the CPIA 
is used to determine the outright grant component with an upfront reduction of 20 per cent in 
overall IDA allocation to a country.   
 
In fact, the strong bias towards the performance-based allocation noted above has been 
further intensified in the process of simplification of the formula at the Mid Term Review of 
IDA-14 with the stated aim at reducing the volatility for IDA-15 (IDA 2007a and b). After 
much discussion, the new formula adopted for IDA-15 is: 
 
Country performance rating = (0.24 * CPIAA-C + 0.68 * CPIAD + 0.08 * PORT)  
 
IDA Country allocation = f (Country performance rating
5.0
, Population
1.0
, GNI/capita
-0.125
) 
 
As evident in this new formula, the exponent applied to the CPIA dominant performance 
rating is raised from the value of 2 to 5 for IDA-15, signifying the much increased weight 
given to the performance rating measured in CPIA compared to the ‗needs‘ variables (IDA 
2007b).
7
 The overall Performance Based Allocation (PBA) system currently in use is 
illustrated in Figure 1-b above.  
 
In assessing the selectivity aid allocation rule in general as well as in determining the grant-
loan mix in the DSF in particular, both of which rest so much on one index, the CPIA, it is 
critical to examine first how the CPIA itself is constructed in relation to a more fundamental 
                                                 
5 In exceptional circumstances the performance-based country allocation is adjusted in the light of countries‘ access to 
alternative financial sources or their emergence from conflict or severe natural disaster. 
 
6 The formulae adopted by the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank give slightly different weights 
to each variable in arriving at the volume of final allocation. It may be worth noting that the Asian Development Fund gives 
as twice as much a weight to the ‗needs‘ variable than that adopted in the IDA allocation, whereas the African Development 
Fund adjusts the performance rating by the post-conflict enhancement factor (IDA 2007a). 
7 . There are a few exceptions that IDA-15 makes in applying the formula for IDA allocation (IDA 2007b). 
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question as to who defines (and how to define) good policies for country-specific conditions.
8
 
At the outset, it is important to note that the CPIA is not an objective measure of the quality 
of policies and institutions, but is a set of subjective scores (1-6 rating scores) by Bank staff, 
based on questionnaires organized with country teams at the World Bank (World Bank 
2005b). 
 
Furthermore, the CPIA is constructed in terms of mixed score parameters: while some 
parameters rank policy choices and institutional quality, others rather reflect outcomes or, 
more often, both outcomes and policy choices. Hence, the World Bank‘s assertion that 
policies and institutional arrangements assessed through the questionnaires can be classified 
as input, which are within the country‘s control, as opposed to outcome (e.g., the growth rate), 
which is influenced by elements beyond the country‘s control, should be seriously questioned. 
In reality, such a separation is often fictitious, as is apparent upon a closer inspection of score 
guidelines listed under each of the CPIA categories (World Bank 2005d).  
 
Many indicators included in the CPIA can be seen as reflecting outcomes influenced by 
exogenous events. For example, the ability of governments to pursue aggregate demand 
policy or fiscal policy, consistent with price stability and achieving external and internal 
balances, is often undermined in the face of large external shocks typically facing fragile 
LICs. The aptitude of governments in providing public goods depends also on their revenue-
raising capacity which, in turn, is affected by exogenous events outside their control. Thus, 
what is assessed is often endogenous to growth, contrary to the claim that the criteria used in 
the CPIA are ―in principle independent of growth outcomes‖ (Collier and Dollar 2004: F255). 
At the same time, some scores are distinctly related to policy choice variables, as illustrated 
in rating score under trade policy, which is based mostly (about 75 per cent) on the ‗trade 
restrictiveness‘ measured in terms of tariff and non-tariff barriers deployed.  
 
While some of the criteria used are not necessarily controversial in their own light and terms 
(e.g., those listed under policies for social inclusion/equity), it should also be recognized that 
the quality of institutions and the implemental capacity for socioeconomic policies, evaluated 
under the CPIA, are often a reflection of structural characteristics of low-income economies.
9
 
Hence, they should be treated as a manifestation of their stage and level of economic 
development rather than that of societal subjective preferences or simple choice parameters of 
recipient governments. These structural characteristics should evolve and change as 
development proceeds. For example, all three dimensions against which financial sector 
policy performance is assessed (financial stability; the sector‘s efficiency, depth, and resource 
mobilization strength; and access to financial services) are dependent on the level and stage 
of economic development. The financial sector develops in tandem with the real sector 
activities as demand and supply for financial services interact dynamically over time.
10
  
 
                                                 
8. The evaluation, carried out in 2009 by the Independent Evaluation Group raises several issues regarding the construct and 
use of the CPIA but not necessarily touches upon many of the fundamental questions discussed here. In general, the 
evaluation confirmed the usefulness of the CPIA as a broad indicator of development effectiveness. The evaluation also 
found, among others, that the contents of the CPIA were largely relevant for growth and poverty reduction and that they 
mapped well with the policies and institutions that are identified in the literature as relevant for growth and poverty 
reduction. However, it recommended a review of the CPIA be made and the criteria revised and streamlined as necessary. 
The evaluation contained specific recommendations on a few CPIA criteria, such as the criteria covering trade, financial 
sector, and equity of public resource use (IEG 2009). 
9 . The IEG evaluation cited above in the footnote 8 in fact recommended that that the CPIA guidelines clarify which criteria 
should take into account the stage of development and how the adjustments should be made, though it actually raises an 
objection in passing to make too much allowance for country-specific factors including the stage of development. 
10 . See our earlier work (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998; Nissanke 2004). 
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Thus, the CPIA-based aid allocation formula cannot be seen as a fair rule, since it gives a 
common scoring to all countries with the equal weighting of the different factors, irrespective 
of the level of development and structural characteristics of each country.
11
 Indeed, a closer 
evaluation of the criteria listed in the CPIA reveals that these scores overlap in many aspects 
with those included in the extended policy conditionality list that the recipient governments 
had to comply in return for aid disbursements under the Washington Consensus (SAPs) and 
the Post-Washington Consensus. The nature of policy conditionality remains largely intact. 
This is not surprising, since the CPIA is based on the premise that ―the broad thrust of World 
Bank policy advice over the last two decades has been correct‖ (Collier and Dollar 2004: 
F246).  
 
What has changed is the method of aid allocation mechanisms from ex ante conditionality to 
performance-based ex-post conditionality. This regime shift does reflect how the aid 
effectiveness debate initiated in the mid-1990s has been conducted at the IFIs and other major 
policy circles in the donor community over the past decade or so. Throughout the two 
decades of 1980s and 1990s, ex ante conditionality, whereby foreign aid and budget supports 
were delivered conditional upon the promises of implementation of stabilization-cum-
structural reforms, was a dominant feature in the donor-recipient relationships. Attaching a 
string of strict ‗policy‘ conditionality was justified then on the grounds that donors should 
actively influence the policy and conduct of recipient countries through ‗aid‘ leverage.  
 
However, in the course of the debate on aid effectiveness, as ‗aid selectivity‘ has become a 
dominant feature in aid delivery, this ex-ante policy conditionality regime was replaced by 
the performance based ex-post conditionality regime. Thus, the original paper that introduced 
the DSF explicitly states that the HIPC Initiative facilitated this regime change ―by limiting 
its support to those countries that are not pursuing sound policies (IMF/the World Bank, 
2004:10).  Clearly, in the debate conducted in western dominated policy circles, the content 
of policy conditionality was not much challenged, except that the list of policy conditionality 
was first extended and subsequently streamlined.
12
  
 
While ‗ownership‘, ‗partnership‘, ‗dialogue‘ etc. are increasingly recognized and promoted as 
an important dimension for success in producing the desired development outcomes through 
aid delivery, the selectivity rule- and performance-based aid allocation as practiced today, 
including the DSF, still amounts to an imposition of one particular development model by the 
donor community on aid recipient countries as an uniquely appropriate, universal model to be 
adopted by all developing countries. From this critical perspective, the CPIA cannot be 
treated, as claimed, as truly performance-based parameters measured in terms of choices of 
policies and institutions leading to desired development outcomes. Instead it is a matrix 
contaminated with ‗intermediate variables‘ that measure the extent to which a recipient 
accepts policy choice parameters as seen desired by donors (Kanbur 2005).   
 
In short, we challenge the current system, under which performance that should be treated as 
a reflection of complicated and dynamic interactions between policy and institutions on one 
hand and initial conditions and structural characteristics on the other is represented by a 
single index – the CPIA. We also question the practice of interpreting of the CPIA as an 
―input‖, ―choice variable‖ on the part of LICs, hence as ―efforts and actions‖ under their own 
                                                 
11 With reference to his criticism of the CPIA, Kanbur (2005) also remarks that a common scoring for all countries is 
justified only if we endorse the assumption of ‗a common development model for all countries‘, postulated in a cross-
country ‗average relationship‘. 
12 See Nissanke (2010a) for a critical review of the aid effectiveness debate conducted at aggregate macro-relationships.  
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control. Guillaumont et al. (2010) also raise similar concerns over the use of the current PBA 
system for aid allocation. Their criticisms are summarized in three points: i) ―performance‖ 
should refer to the results or outcomes obtained by a country in a given initial situation, 
whereas PBA performance refers to a subjective assessment of the country policy; ii) the 
CPIA is a subjective assessment, with regard to uniform norms, which does not particularly 
fit in with the principles of alignment and ownership; and finally iii) the CPIA is not stable, 
making the allocation unstable and hardly predictable, and it is pro-cyclical, leading to less 
aid when the countries need the more. 
 
In this context, we further argue that there should be room for open discussion and debate on 
different development models, rather than imposing a monolithic model of economic 
development and reforms. It is now widely accepted that many Asian countries in the fast 
growing region under contemporary globalisation have not followed the development model 
that the Washington Consensus had advocated for a long time.
13
 LICs should be given a 
space for policy learning and policy experimentation, as suggested by Morrissey (2004). 
There should also be a policy space for institutional innovations. The impressive poverty 
reduction in China achieved in 1980s is a lot to do with institutional innovations such as 
Township-Village Enterprises. Thus, Rodrik (2004) argues that ―effective institutional 
outcomes do not map into unique institutional designs‖, and that ―there is no unique, non-
context specific way of achieving desirable institutional outcomes. Since what works will 
depend on local constraints and opportunities, we should bear in mind that institutional 
prescriptions should be contingent on the prevailing characteristics of the local economy and 
that institutional design has to be context-specific‖ (Rodrik 2004: 9).  
 
Therefore, we also argue that institutional and policy design for economic development has to 
be context-specific and, hence, that the quality of institutions and policies are not so 
mechanically and quantitatively rated as practiced in the CPIA. It should be noted here that 
we do endorse the need for specifying conditionality for any inter-temporal aid and debt 
contracts, including sovereign debt contracts with LIC. There is nothing controversial about 
sovereign debt contracts exchanged between LICs and official aid-development agencies 
specifying conditions that conform to international rules, norms and code of conduct as well 
as procedures for LICs‘ access to official concessional loans. The issue at stake, and what is 
debated, is, however, the nature and content of policy conditionality, which could be objected 
on the ground of being an imposition of a particular development model as a universally 
superior model on LICs, and the way policy conditionality has been practiced to date in one 
form or another.
14
  
 
II.3. Critical review of empirical evidences used for determining the debt burden 
thresholds and aid allocation 
 
As other recent studies attempting to build an ‗early warning‘ system for predicting the 
likelihood of financial crises, Kraay and Nehru (2004, 2006) use a probit model, applied to 
132 LICs and MICs for the period of 1970-2002, to examine determinants of ‗debt distress‘, 
defined as periods in which countries resort to any of the three forms of exceptional finance: 
                                                 
13  See for example, Milanovich (2003), among many other studies that have emerged to question and clarify the 
interpretations of the East Asian development model in the East Asian Miracle Study by the World Bank (1993).  It is also 
worth noting here that the post Washington Consensus is not a significant revision, but a rather modified, more nuanced 
version of the earlier Washington Consensus. 
14 . Kanbur (2005) makes a similar point in his assessment of the aid allocation adopted in the IDA-14. 
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(i) significant arrears on external debt, (ii) Paris Club rescheduling, and (iii) non concessional 
IMF lending.  A 25 % probability of debt distress is chosen as a benchmark distress level. 
They find that three factors explain a substantial fraction of the cross-country and time-series 
variation in the incidence of debt distress: the debt burden, the quality of policies and 
institutions as measured by the CPIA rating, and shocks that affect real GDP growth. They 
also find that the relative importance of these three factors differs between low-income 
countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs). Further, they place a particular 
emphasis on their ‗central‘ finding that the quality of policies and institutions is key 
determinants of debt distress in LICs and the contemporaneous effect of improvements in 
policies and institutions on the probability of debt distress is quantitatively large, and is 
roughly of the same order of magnitude as reductions in debt burdens (Kraay and Nehru, 
2006:2-3).  
 
Based on the confidence in their findings after carrying out several ‗robustness‘ checks, they 
draw particular attention to the policy implications of their central findings for the lending 
strategies of multilateral concessional creditors. First, they urge policy makers not to use a 
common single debt sustainability threshold for all LICs, but to use thresholds, which are 
differentiated among LICs according to the CPIA score. As an example, they cite their 
benchmark results suggesting that countries at the 75th percentile of the CPIA score can have 
a present value of debt to exports that is two to three times higher than countries at the 25th 
percentile of this indicator, without increasing the probability of debt distress. Thus, they 
conclude that countries with better policies and institutions can carry substantially higher debt 
burdens than countries with worse policies and institutions without increasing their risk of 
debt distress. Second, they caution policy makers against providing a large scaling-up aid in 
concessional loans that could lead to very sharp increases in debt burdens of many LICs.  
Instead, they recommend greater use of grants to LICs with a lower CPIA score. 
 
The central claim of their study, confirmed by a similar study by the IMF team (IMF- 
IDA 2004a)
15
, provided the IFIs with the empirical basis for determining the debt burden 
thresholds and a grant-loan composition according to CPIA scores in the DSF.  
Thresholds for the present value (PV) of debt to GDP, debt to exports, and debt to revenue 
were calibrated using the results obtained by the IMF team in 2004, while thresholds for debt 
service to exports and debt service to revenue were calibrated using the Kraay-Nehru study. 
In 2011, preceding the most recent Review of the DSF, the IMF staff re-estimated these 
models using updated data and a single methodological framework to identify debt distress 
and non-distress episodes. In their re-estimation, a number of experiments were attempted 
such as including remittances in external debt thresholds or the use of ‗probability – based‘ 
estimation that traces country-specific evolution of debt distress, yet the basic structure of the 
model specification were not altered. Consequently, the Review concluded that the re-
estimated thresholds are roughly in line with the current DSF thresholds, with the exception 
of the threshold for debt service to revenue. The latter would result in setting a lower level of 
thresholds than in the current DSF.   
  
Yet, in our view, the model specification itself should have been questioned and re-examined, 
as it has been subjected to legitimate criticisms and challenges on a number of 
methodological grounds. For example, in addition to the problems associated with the use of 
the CPIA rating as an accurate measure of the quality of policy and institutions as already 
                                                 
15 . There are some differences between the two studies carries out by Kraay and Nehru (2004, 2006) and IMF (2004a) in 
some technical aspects such as the samples used, the definitions of debt distress episodes or the probability of debt distress 
selected. See Box 4 and Annex 1 of IMF-WB (2012) for detailed information. 
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discussed, the use of real GDP growth as a proxy for shocks is inadequate and inappropriate 
for capturing the effects of exogenous shocks that should be seriously considered as one of 
the main factors affecting the debt crisis in LICs. However, real GDP growth is chosen to 
capture both exogenous and endogenous shocks in these studies. They do not provide any 
explanation why more appropriate measures of exogenous shocks such as the Economic 
Vulnerability Index (EVI) are not tried as alternative measures of shocks.
16
 Real GDP growth 
are outcomes of various factors, including exogenous events/shocks, policies applied and 
institutions in place as well as other factors such as unpredictable aid flows which could 
randomly alleviate illiquidity problems and debt distress. Therefore, both variables, CPIA and 
real GDP growth included in their probit models, can be suspected to be ‗contaminated‘ by 
much noise. Moreover, the two variables must also be closely correlated contemporaneously, 
if we accept their reasoning for using them as main explanatory variables. If a debt burden 
indicator - another explanatory variable in the model – is expressed as ratio to GDP, there 
will be further inverse correlation issues among three explanatory variables, pointing to non-
linearity. 
17
 Further, the decision to use a 25 % of probability as thresholds is an arbitrary one, 
since this choice has been made on the basis of their model specification and estimation 
results. 
  
Indeed, as discussed in Cohen et al. (2008), other simulation exercises on debt distress similar 
to the Kraay and Nehru study show that the likelihood of a debt crisis in low-income 
countries is triggered by external shocks such as negative price shocks to earnings from 
exports of primary commodities as much as (if not more) the governance index developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (Kaufmann et.al 2005).
18
 These findings shed serious doubts 
upon the central position assigned to the CPIA rating as a predictor of debt distress episodes, 
and hence, the empirical basis for the DSF is found rather fragile, certainly less robust than 
claimed in the official papers produced by the IMF and World Bank. 
 
In fact, these studies used for determining CPIA-centred debt thresholds share many 
methodological problems previously raised in relation to other empirical studies carried out at 
the World Bank to justify the performance-based selectivity for a basis of aid allocation. The 
analytical and empirical basis for the selectivity approach rests almost entirely on cross-
country regression results of the growth-aid relationship in Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) 
or Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002, 2004), which led to a very strong policy conclusion that 
the growth-enhancing effect of aid can be found only in a good policy environment.  
However, the empirical findings and analyses of these studies have been seriously challenged 
                                                 
16  See below Section II.4 for our discussion on the EVI. Kraay and Nehru (2006) state that in their robustness check tests, 
real exchange movements and Terms of Trade shocks are tried but these are not found significant predictors in their model 
specifications.  
17
 Their results could also be challenged on account of possible estimation errors due to missing variables that 
explain the likelihood of debt distress. For example, we should not ignore the fact that many LICs for the 
estimation period were heavily aid-dependent and relied often on aid for its shock damping effects, as revealed 
in Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001). Aid flows to the HIPCs for the estimation period are known to be highly 
unpredictable and volatile throughout.  
18  The governance index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi ( Kaufmann et.al 2005) is used as a substitute for 
the CPIA index which was not publicly available till 2007. The index covers six dimensions of governance: voice and 
accountability; political stability and the absence of major violence and terror; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 
rule of law; and control of corruption. However, Kaufman (2005) warns against using it mechanically for ranking countries, 
as margins of error are not trivial and caution is required in interpreting the results. 
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subsequently on several weaknesses in empirical methods by a large number of empirical 
analyses carried out outside the World Bank.
19
   
 
Yet, cross-country regression analyses such as Burnside and Dollar and Collier and Dollar 
had very strong and direct influences on policy making and actual aid allocation mechanisms 
in favour of performance-based adopted by multilateral and bilateral donors. This is because 
the selectivity rule had a powerful appeal for the donor community as an effective instrument 
to overcome the moral hazard problems in dealing with recipient governments. In particular, 
the poverty-efficient aid allocation proposed by Collier and Dollar ((2001 and 2002), which 
used the CPIA as a screening device, has become influential in the policy debate on the 
feasibility of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), where the poverty 
reduction is singled out as the most important objective of giving aid and publicised as such 
in order to mobilise public support for securing aid budgets in donor countries. 
 
Subsequently, Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) attribute the weaknesses of methodologies 
employed in these cross-country regressions to: i) the treatment of the complex causality 
chain linking external aid to final outcomes as a black box; and ii) the heterogeneity of aid 
motives, iii) the limitations of the tools of analysis. They argue for disentangling the causality 
chain inside the black box as a first step towards gaining a deeper understanding of the 
impact of aid on economic development. As shown in Figure -2, they identify three types of 
links in the black box: (i) policies to outcomes (knowledge); (ii) policymakers to policies 
(governance and institutional capacity); and (iii) donors to policymakers (financial resources, 
technical assistance and aid policy conditionality). Clearly, such detailed analyses of the 
causality chain cannot be effectively conducted through simple reduced-form cross-country 
regressions at the aggregate level, which have been a popular analytical tool in empirical 
research on aid effectiveness.   
Figure 2: The causality chain: inside the black box 
 
Source: Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006: Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
19  Nissanke (2010a) presents a summary of many analytical and methodological issues raised in evaluation and assessments 
of these empirical studies during the aid effectiveness debate.  Further, for other critical assessments of the empirical 
analyses by Burnside and Dollar (1997. 2000) and Collier and Dollar (200, 2002 and 2004) , see Easterly et al. (2003), 
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) ,  Hansen and Tarp (2001a,b),  Delgaard et.al (2004), and 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) .    
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Thus, the empirical basis used to rationalise the current CPIA-dominated, performance-based 
selectivity approach to aid allocation as ex-post conditionality, in which the DSF is 
structurally embedded, is thin and unconvincing. The ‗Deaton Report‘—an influential 
evaluation report of World Bank research for 1998-2005, conducted by a group of 
independent academics (Deaton et al. 2006),  also exposed the methodological flaws in these 
cross-country regressions carried out the World Bank.  Warning against the practice of using 
selectively the empirical evidence to support an advocacy position, the Report concludes that 
―much of this line of research appears to have such deep flaws that, at present, the result 
cannot be regarded as remotely reliable, much as one might want to believe (p.53)‖.  
 
Furthermore, legitimate concerns have also been raised over the fact that using discrete CPIA 
cut-offs as practiced in the current DSF gives rise to ‗CPIA threshold effects‘, whereby a 
small change in a country‗s CPIA score near the boundary of two policy performance 
categories (i.e. CPIA score near 3.25 or 3.75) results in a large shift in debt burden thresholds. 
These artificial ‗cliff-like effects‘ are the direct outcome from the way these CPIA-centred 
empirical exercises are carried out. In order to avoid such artificial effects, it has been 
suggested that the debt-burden thresholds should be set for each country on the basis of 
country-specific information such as growth performance or other key macroeconomic 
indicators.  
  
However, despite all these technical issues and concerns, the recent Review endorsed keeping 
the current practice of the CPIA-centred debt burden thresholds without really providing 
convincing reasons.  Presumably, the need for applying a standardised set of thresholds to all 
aid eligible countries on a comparable basis stems from the fact that the DSF is designed to 
be used as a basic principle underlying aid allocation mechanisms on the basis of the risk 
rating assigned to countries. Hence, this may have worked against setting country-specific 
debt thresholds. Yet, it is still hard to find a scientific justification for settling on the CPIA-
centred debt burden thresholds over the use of other indicators in establishing thresholds, to 
which we shall now turn our discussion. 
II.4. Alternative Approaches to Determining Debt Burden Thresholds and the Grant-
Loan Mix 
Our critical review of the DSF so far points abundantly to the need for taking into account a 
country‘s various structural characteristics for understanding its debt carrying capacity. In 
this regard, the proposal made by Guillaumont et al (2010) deserves urgent attention as a 
promising way forward for improving the performance-based allocation system (PBA) for the 
IDA allocation. They argue that relying on a debatable definition of ‗performance‘ dominated 
by the CPIA, the current PBA does not meet the equity concern arising from LIC‘s structural 
handicaps to growth and development. Their main points are that: i) it presupposes that aid 
effectiveness only depends on the quality of policy and governance, itself measured in a 
subjective and unstable manner; ii)  it refers to a narrow notion of needs, captured by the GNI 
per capita, instead of addressing the equity issue; and iii) it is not at all transparent, due to an 
excess use of exceptions needed to make the formula acceptable through caps and floors for  
fragile states and/or post-conflict or conflict-prone countries, and these are treated only in a 
curative manner.  
 
Therefore, they call for improvement by introducing key indicators of measuring structural 
handicaps into the current PBA system on grounds of equity, effectiveness and transparency. 
Structural handicaps facing LICs stem from their economic vulnerability and low human 
capital that they face, which cannot be regarded as their ―choice‖ and ―will‖. Hence, they 
18 
 
propose to augment the PBA by including the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI)
20
 and the 
Human Asset Index (HAI) to reflect LICs‘ structural vulnerability for country performance 
rating (CPR) and a country‘s ―needs‖ respectively.  
 
They note that the EVI already exists, as it is currently used by the UN for identifying the 
Least Developed Countries as a distinctive group among developing countries, as such it can 
be easily extended to other LICs currently not classified as LDCs. The EVI captures a 
country‘s vulnerability resulting from the recurrence of exogenous shocks, either natural or 
external (droughts as well commodity prices instability) and the exposure to these shocks 
(small size, remoteness, structure of production). Hence, the EVI is a composite indicator 
comprising seven elements, which can be grouped into two categories: i) under the size of the 
recurrent exogenous shocks, and ii) the exposure to these shocks. For measuring the fist 
category, it uses the instability of exports of goods and services; the instability of agricultural 
production; and the homelessness due to natural disasters.  For measuring the second 
category it uses: the smallness of population (log) number; the remoteness from world 
markets; the export concentration; and the share of agriculture, fisheries and forestry in GDP. 
The HAI is a composite index of health and education components, also used for the 
identification of the LDC.  It consists of four indices respectively related to child survival, 
percentage of population undernourished, literacy rate and secondary enrolment ratio. For an 
actual inclusion in the CPR, Guillaumont et al. (2010) recommend the use of a low human 
capital index (LHAI=Max HAI – HAI. 
 
This proposal by Guillaumont et al. (2010) could provide us with a promising direction for 
improving the DSF.  In advancing a new overall aid allocation in IDA, we argue strongly, as 
they do, that ignoring structural handicaps measured by the EVI and LHAI in determining 
debt burden thresholds is indeed a major omission in the current DSF, creating a sense of 
unfairness. Furthermore, we also suggest that the present system has not attended ‗incentive‘ 
issues adequately, as LICs are assessed by criteria, which encompass consequences from 
exogenous shocks generated by events outside their control. Overcoming structural handicaps 
that result in high economic vulnerability to shocks and low capacity to withstand them is 
what the process of economic development entails for LICs. Aid as development finance is 
supposed to contribute to this vital process of structural transformation. Unfortunately, the 
CPIA-centred aid allocation and the CPIA-dominated DSF amount to penalising many 
structurally handicapped LICs. Such a system is not conducive to delivering aid to those 
countries where transformation of economic structures and increasing their resilience to 
exogenous shocks is most needed. 
 
Hence, in this context, we call for a major reform, not marginal changes, to the current DSF.  
As part of such a reform, the EVI and the HAI should be used as an alternative or, at least, as 
a complementary screening device, to the revised CPIA, for assessing the likelihood of 
falling into debt distress situations by discriminating a different capacity of LICs to carry debt 
burdens.
21
 If the IEG recommendation of discontinuing the ―stage of development‖ 
adjustment to the CPIA rating is followed through, the use of the EVI and HAI would 
become even more critical in the overall system of the PBA and DSF.  While the ―stage of 
development‖ adjustment to the CPIA rating on an ad-hoc basis as practiced so far is indeed 
                                                 
20 . Patrick Guillaumont  is the major contributor to constructing the EVI over  many years. See Guillaumont   (2009) for 
detailed discussion of the EVI. 
21 . As mentioned in the Footnotes 8 and 10 above, the CPIA rating system is under review, as result of the IEG report (IEG, 
2009) , which made four recommendations: disclose IBRD ratings, discontinue the ―stage of development‖ adjustment to the 
ratings, review and revise the content and clustering of the criteria, and discontinue the current aggregation of the criteria 
into an overall index (IEG, 2009).  
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unsatisfactory, accounting for structural characteristics through the EVI and HAI in the PBA 
and DSF is absolutely essential. Under the present DSF, a country‘s vulnerability to shocks is 
only considered when stress tests are undertaken to predict the likelihood of future debt 
distress and crisis when the debt sustainability analyses are conducted for an individual 
country, as discussed in Section III.1-2 below. This is completely inadequate, since overall 
aid allocation is decided on the formulae dominated by the CPIA. A new system of defining 
debt burden thresholds as resulting from future empirical work in this critical aspect would be 
not only fair but more incentive-aligned.  
 
Further, we recognise that the inclusion of the EVI and HAI may not automatically negate the 
need to take into account, as an incentive consideration, the quality of policy and institutions 
of a country as an additional screening device. Naturally, any new measure for the quality of 
policy and institutions should be radically different from the way the current CPIA is 
constructed. The new index should be a streamlined one, netting out much of the ―noises‖ 
which are outside the control of LICs.  Our preference would be an index, which assesses 
LICs in terms of their adherence to universally accepted international codes of conduct and 
norms as well as to efforts to make social progress in place of the controversial CPIA ratings 
subjectively constructed at the World Bank. Such codes could include a strict adherence to 
basic human right as embedded in the UN convention/resolution, a degree of transparency 
and accountability to domestic stakeholders in policy making and governance as well as 
efforts of governments to achieve MDGs and post-MDGs, which are agreed collectively by 
the international community at large.
22
 Indeed, we reckon that the use of such an index that 
specifies conditionality of practicing these codes and norms for accessing to aid, would 
invoke little controversy and encourage nurturing good governance and real democracy in 
LICs.  
 
An appropriate weight given to these different indices in aid allocation and calculation of 
debt burden thresholds should be left to future empirical analyses as well as to open 
discussions among various stakeholders, once this new proposal is accepted in principle. We 
also predict that the combined use of different indices, including the EVI and HAI in 
calculating debt burden thresholds would avoid a very sharp, cliff-like shifts of thresholds 
applied to a country in the current DSA exercises, which may have partly originated from 
some unstable CPIA ratings obtained. 
   
Another area we call for urgent amendment to the current DSF is the present practice of a 
mechanical application of the traffic light system for deciding the grant-loan mix in aid 
allocation.  First of all, in deciding on the grant-loan‘ mix, a country‘s overall debt carrying 
capacity should be primarily assessed against its performance in public finance and debt 
management, not the mixed score such as the CPIA.
23
 Further, grants cannot be seen always a 
better modality of aid delivery compared with debt contracts. For example, if grants are the 
only instruments used for aid provision, the size of overall aid envelope could be limited by 
budget constraints bilateral donor governments and multilateral development agencies face. 
Indeed, as noted in Gunther (2009), increasing aid through loans entails lower real costs for 
donors than providing the same nominal amount of aid in the form of grants. The use of 
                                                 
22  Gunter et al. (2009) reports the findings from their probit analysis similar to the original ―Kraay-Nehru‖ study to suggest 
that the capacity to bear debt is related to progress made in social development and their findings of statistically significant 
positive effects of social development on the debt carrying capacity even after controlling for good policies and institutions. 
 
23 . Since the World Bank country mission makes an assessment on Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA), 
the data should be readily available.  
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concessional loans allows the augmentation of the overall aid resources envelope, as donor 
governments and official multilateral agencies can utilize more funds mobilized through 
efficient inter-temporal management of their own resources, including recycling principal 
repayments and any interest payments on the loans made earlier. 
24
  
 
Importantly, an appropriate configuration of the grant-loan mix should be decided dependent 
on what aid is used for. Many infrastructure projects which can alleviate various absorption 
capacity constraints and critical supply bottlenecks could in principle generate high growth 
dividends and social returns if projects are managed efficiently to create a stream of steady 
cash flows over a period corresponding to a negotiated debt payment schedule. For financing 
these types of projects, concessional loans can be a superior instrument to grants. The 
maturity and other terms associated with concessional loans such as the IDA loans and ADF 
loans are indeed very generous. For example, IDA loans are presently offered to LICs with 
grant elements often around 60-70 %, with maturity of 40 years, including a 10-year grace 
period, carrying very low interest rates, as discussed in details in Sections IV and V below. 
Productive investment financed by these highly concessional loans should be able to generate 
returns to make serving easily affordable if projects are designed and managed well. Seen in 
this light, the sharp division of  IDA- only countries into ―red-light‖ (100 % grant), ―yellow-
light‖ ( 50 % grant- 50% IDA credit) and ―green-light‖ (100 % IDA credit) as practiced in the 
DSF is, in our view, overly artificial within the 10-year grace period.  
 
What is more useful is to provide valuable technical assistance for managing the financed 
projects to generate tangible growth dividends, enhanced cash flows and tax revenues so that 
debt is serviced according to the schedule laid out. As discussed in Section V below, if 
generous concessional loans are offered in properly structured, incentive-compatible debt 
contract, they are superior to outright grants in financing productive investment, provided that 
projects are carefully selected, well designed and executed. What is needed is to address 
LICs‘ high vulnerability to exogenous shocks with an efficiently structured contingent 
financing facility (see Section V). 
 
On the other hand, grants can well be more appropriate for financing social infrastructures 
such as education and health or economic infrastructure financing rural roads or water supply 
to the poor. Investment in health and education, for example, would take a longer time to 
generate growth dividends. It is also hard to project cash flows over time from funding the 
social sector or those targeting specifically at the poor compared with productive investment 
in large economic infrastructure projects. For example, returns to investment in human capital 
accruing to individuals are widely dispersed, requiring an efficient tax system to recuperate. 
The latter itself takes a longer time for governments to create and administer. Therefore, 
grants are needed for covering the cost for this kind of investment or technical assistance and 
cooperation. All these point to a great care required in deciding which aid instruments and 
modality are appropriate on a case-by-case basis. 
III Critical Appraisal of the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) embedded in the 
DSF 
III.1.The Construct of DSAs and Proposed Changes   
 
                                                 
24 For example, IDA is known to receive a substantial reflows on previous IDA loans, which enhances its  overall resource 
envelope by substantial amounts. 
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The Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) applied to an individual country and conducted so 
far within the DSF comprises three elements
25
: 1) constructing a baseline scenario of debt 
dynamics, representing the projected macroeconomic framework with economic policies and 
growth potentials, main assumptions and relevant parameters; 2) conducting a series of 
bound/stress tests applied to the baseline scenario, providing a probabilistic upper bound for 
the debt dynamics under different assumptions; 3) constructing alternative scenarios (Barkbu 
et.al. 2008).
26
  
 
The DSAs in place are used to be carried out separately for external debt and public debt. The 
formulae used for generating a baseline scenario debt dynamics in the DSA are presented in 
Appendix 2. As shown in  Equation (2) in Appendix 2, external debt  dynamics, expressed as 
a ratio of the present value of debt stock  to exports, is generated by dynamics of the current 
primary balance (the external financial gap) adjusted for concessional financing and the 
difference between the concessional interest rates (it ) and the growth rate  of exports (ɛt). On 
the other hand, public debt dynamics is generated by dynamics of primary fiscal deficit in 
relation to GDP and the difference between real interest rate (rt) and real growth rate (gt), as 
expressed in Equation (4).   
 
In the DSAs six bound/stress tests are conducted for external debt sustainability, applying 
historical averages minus one standard deviation, applied to real GDP, exports; GDP deflator; 
non-debt-creating flows (e.g.FDI); a combination of all these four variables; and a 30 percent 
devaluation of the national currency. For public debt sustainability, five bound tests are 
conducted using historical averages minus one standard deviation, applied to real GDP, the 
primary fiscal balance, a combination of the two; a 30 percent devaluation of the national 
currency; a 10 percentage point of GDP increase in debt-creating flows.  The shocks are 
expected to last for five years.  
 
Further, for the external debt, two alternative scenarios are constructed: i) a historical 
scenario at their historical averages of real GDP, GDP deflator, growth, noninterest current 
account in percentage of GDP, and non- debt- creating flows; and ii) a scenario with less 
favourable financing terms. For the public debt, three scenarios are constructed:  i) a 
historical scenario at their historical averages applied to real GDP and the primary balance; ii) 
a scenario with the primary balance in the projection period equal to the first year of 
projection; and iii) a scenario with permanently lower real GDP growth (Barkbu et.al 2008). 
All the elements in the DSAs cover uniformly a period of over 20 years for LICs, instead of a 
five-year projection used for Middle-Income Countries (MICs), on account of the long 
maturities of LIC debt. The use of debt indicators expressed in PV terms is also justified on 
the ground of predominance of concessional debt, as discussed below.  It also uses a 25 
percent probability of distress for stress tests.
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In the current DSAs, a country is assigned one of the following four debt distress rankings 
solely on the basis of an analysis of external public debt relative to the indicative CPIA-based 
thresholds over a 20-year projection period: 
                                                 
25 .The recent Review of the DSF recommends that a full joint Bank-Fund DSA is produced every three years with lighter 
joint updates in the interim years (IMF/World Bank, 2012). 
26
 The terms of bound and stress tests are used interchangeable in the IMF documents. 
27 . The use of a 25 percent probability of distress in the stress test as a benchmark is somewhat arbitrary. This benchmark is 
quite conservative in the light of other earlier studies. For example, Cohen (1997) calculates the growth impact of a debt 
crisis at various probabilities to identify the probability of debt distress that has the largest negative effect on growth. He 
finds that a 60 percent probability of distress has the maximum effect on growth. 
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 Low risk (green-light): All the debt burden indicators are well below the thresholds.  
 Moderate risk (yellow-light): Debt burden indicators are below the thresholds in the 
baseline scenario, but stress tests indicate that the thresholds could be breached if 
there are external shocks or abrupt changes in macroeconomic policies.  
 High risk (red-light): One or more debt burden indicators breach the thresholds on a 
protracted basis under the baseline scenario.  
 In debt distress: The country is already experiencing difficulties in servicing its debt, 
as evidenced, for example, by the existence of arrears.  
 
Since its official release in 2004-5, several methodological issues have been raised with 
respect to the DSAs and a series of modifications have been made through regular review 
processes. The most recent Review carried out in 2011 is more comprehensive and proposed 
to strengthen DSAs in several important aspects  by: 1) refining stress tests to better reflect 
dynamic linkages between macroeconomic variables; 2) deepening the analysis of total 
public debt and fiscal vulnerabilities; 3) carrying out an additional risk rating for countries 
with significant vulnerabilities related to domestic public debt or private external debt; 4) 
incorporating explicitly the link between debt-financed investment and growth into DSAs; 
and 5)  simplifying the temperate to be used easily by country authorities (IMF/World Bank, 
2012).
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We present below our evaluation of the proposed revisions to the DSAs under four sub-
headings: revised methodological refinements to stress tests (Section III.2); interrelations 
among external, public and private debt (SectionII.3); a review of scaling factors to debt 
burden indicators and the role of discount rates in debt management (Section III.4); review of 
the proposed DSAs with application of the DGE as a coherent forward looking 
macroeconomic framework for examining the effects public investment surges on debt 
sustainability (Section III.5).  
III.2. Methodological Refinements to Stress Tests 
III.2.1 Baseline Scenario and Stress Tests in the current DSA 
 
In the current DSAs all projections of debt dynamics under a baseline scenario are generated 
by applying macroeconomic relationships leading to debt dynamics such as Equations (2) and 
(4) in the Appendix 2. For this, various assumptions have to be made with respect to key 
variables by the staff at the IFIs. These are in turn derived from the underlying 
macroeconomic framework in use at the IFI. Though the DSAs are often presented as 
authoritative forecasts with forward-looking and probabilistic features, we should interpret 
them with due caution and care, as with any forecasts over future events. As noted in the 
original IMF paper, ―such projections are only as good as their underlying assumptions, and 
these assumptions have a particularly slender basis for the long time horizon implied by the 
average maturity of concessional loans. The scope for error is large, both on the upside and 
the downside (IMF 2004a: 13)‖.  
 
The baseline is first compared with a historical scenario. Further, a reality check of the 
baseline scenario is carried out to compare the projected time paths against alternative 
scenarios created by a series of bound tests through exposing key variables to various shocks. 
                                                 
28 .The recent Review of the DSF recommends that a full joint Bank-Fund DSA is produced every three years with lighter 
joint updates in the interim years (IMF/World Bank, 2012). 
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The bound/stress tests are done to reveal the implication of temporary adverse deviations in 
key parameters from the baseline projections. In addition to the uniform deviations 
standardised across countries indicated above, the DSF suggests using the size of the 
deviations informed by country-specific historical experiences with volatility. The stress tests 
are calibrated under these alternative scenarios so that the implied outcome for the long-term 
debt ratio (say, at a 10- year horizon) has a roughly 25 percent likelihood of occurring. 
 
For illustrative purposes, two original examples of external debt and public debt dynamic in 
the DSA are shown in the Appendix1, Fig.A-1. At first sight, these procedures appear 
rigorous enough to create a set of useful projections for a country‘s future paths of debt 
dynamics and hence to make informed decisions on borrowing/lending. However, the stress 
tests calibrated around the baseline scenario are not necessarily informative under scrutiny as 
historical series of averages and volatility used for stress tests can be a poor guide in most 
cases for future predictions. The averages would not generate a trajectory with any volatility 
close to the real world phenomenon, while the pattern of volatility historically observed may 
not repeat itself.  
 
This is the case especially if a country emerges from a conflict situation, with a radical 
change of government or experiencing some structural changes with new investment 
triggered, say, by a discovery of a natural resource or changes in some main economic 
policies. Then, the relationships between macroeconomic variables could undergo some 
significant changes. So projections should factor in these structural brakes. It is known that 
the underlying macroeconomic interrelationships are typically highly unstable in LICs, much 
more so than in developed countries, especially if they experience not just one-off brakes but 
some structural brakes continuously, political turmoil or other shocks. Hence, the accuracies 
in forward-looking projections over a 20 year time horizon are seriously in doubt, even 
though DSAs are supposed to be carried out annually to update and feed newly arising 
information into analyses. Any debt sustainability assessment is only valid within the bounds 
of the underlying guesses, as Wyplosz (2007) reminds us. This is not only because the future 
is unknown inherently, but particularly so because we live in an ever-increasing, highly 
uncertain, globally integrated world, which can expose LICs more frequently to larger 
shocks.   
III.2.2 Alternative analysis to stress tests   
 
The Review in 2011 accepted the criticisms that the technique of using various pre-
determined scenarios for stress tests in the DSAs can be improved upon in several directions, 
including the use of more dynamic simulation techniques.  This is because while efforts are 
made to apply country-specific events/shocks for bound tests in addition to standardised 
analyses of the impact of shocks (applied for ease of comparison across LICs), most DSAs 
conducted so far  did not exploit fully the time-series historical data for forecasting exercises. 
As Arizala et al. (2008) note, it does not take into account uncertainty about future 
movements of macroeconomic variables that are directly relevant to determining debt 
dynamics.  The pre-Review DSAs take a deterministic approach, simply first projecting one 
base scenario for debt indicators such as the debt- GDP ratio, then apply various stress tests 
to generate different scenarios, rather than applying updated econometric techniques allowing 
dynamic stochastic simulations.  
 
As the manual produced by the research team at the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) describes, there are alternative approaches to calculating the likelihood that specific 
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unfavourable shocks raise debts to levels that exceed the servicing capacity or fall into an 
explosive path over time (Borensztein et al., 2010).
29
 The ―Value at Risk analysis (fan charts 
analyses)‖ is one of these methods, widely used for short-term macroeconomic forecasting. 
This analytical tool is based on two main ideas: ―history allows evaluating the probability of 
various events or combinations of events, and that reactions should take into account both the 
possible severity of each event and its likelihood (Wyplosz 2007: 22).‖ The framework of 
―Fan Charts‖ can incorporate the structure of random shocks hitting the economy to obtain a 
complete distribution of probable outcomes. It hence recognises that ―even when the 
government is resolute in pursuing its fiscal targets, the outcomes are subject to significant 
risks, especially as the planning horizon lengthens (Arizala et al., 2008)‖.  The probabilistic 
approach undertaken to uncertainty analyses is superior to the approach to forecasting 
adopted in pre-Review DSAs. The latter does not take into account how the main key 
variables in the equations of debt dynamics interact with one another. Specifically, the fan 
chart techniques allow exploiting correlations among these variables. This is important since 
the interdependence among various variables, reflected in co-movements in macroeconomic 
variables, could provide important information for projections of the impacts of shocks under 
consideration irrespective of whether individual shocks, or combined shocks, are examined. 
 
Hence, the DSF Review recommended the use the Value at Risk analysis (fan charts 
analyses) in parallel on an experimental basis to exploit dynamic interactions among key 
macroeconomic variables in a country-specific context, as far as data availability allows.  As 
described in detail in Arizala et al.(2008), risk measure is approximated using a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model, which captures the correlation pattern between a set of macro 
variables and produces the joint dynamics for all the variables included in the analysis. The 
procedure in the fan charts can be automated to generate randomly a very large number of 
shocks, through Monte-Carlo simulations, assigning a probability of occurrence to each 
shock. Therefore, a corresponding evolution of the debt dynamics associated with shocks is 
finally produced with a probability of occurrence. Fan charts such as those shown in Fig. 3 
can be obtained through this procedure without making any arbitrary choices about the nature 
and size of shocks as in the DSAs so far used. The procedure could offer more accurate 
estimates of the probability of each event.  
 
Figure 3   Fan Charts 
                                                 
29
 . In the manual, they consider five approaches in details. They are: 1) Standard Approach, 2) Endogenous 
Debt Dynamics, 3) Sudden Stop, 4) Fan Charts and 5) Natural Debt Limit. 
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Source: Fig.14 in Borensztein, E. et. al (2010) 
 
The advantage of using fan charts over the stress tests under different scenarios in the pre-
Review DSAs lies in the former‘s ability to produce a graphic illustration of wide-ranging 
possible paths of debt dynamics induced by shocks. In other words, the fan charts are capable 
of conveying a ‗message‘ of probabilistic nature of debt sustainability exercises much more 
explicitly. The users are provided with charts of debt dynamics showing increasing standard 
deviations around the central path over time. If appropriately used, the fan charts can offer a 
useful forum for policy dialogue between sovereign borrowers and lenders. More informed 
borrowing/lending decisions can be made with better appreciation that the projected debt 
dynamics are indeed just an indication of possible paths, each of which has a different degree 
of probabilities attached. Fan charts also demonstrate graphically how much and how quickly 
the predictive power diminishes over time. They clearly show that it is almost impossible to 
predict debt dynamics over a medium-to-long time horizon with any sort of acceptable ranges 
of accuracy, certainly beyond a five year period.
30
 In short, it reminds us plentifully of ‗futile‘ 
nature of exercises of predicting debt sustainability in principle in a world governed by high 
uncertainty.  
 
Importantly, we should bear in mind that the use of the fan charts approach does not 
guarantee the accuracy of forecasting value generated. It is still build on the assumption that 
the past is a good guide for future. It assumes that historical correlations among variables 
observed in the past are equally relevant for future. As noted above, however, in evolving 
dynamic economic settings, this assumption may prove incorrect as much as in the current 
DSAs, since interactions among variables could well undergo significant changes.  
 
In this context, Arizala et al. (2008) note that being purely backward looking in the 
forecasting procedure, the fan charts analysis based on the simple VAR model ―does not take 
into account shifts in policies and ongoing structural changes in the economy. The more 
frequent these situations, the less reliable the econometric estimates for the prediction of 
                                                 
30 . This is the reason behind the popular use of the fan charts analysis for short-run macroeconomic forecasting such as in 
periodically published ―Inflation Reports‖ at the Bank of England or other central banks. It is not used much for generating 
long-term predictions spanning beyond a 10-year period.  
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future evolutions of the variables of interest‖. They mention that structural VARs can be used 
in place of the simple VAR model, to interpret the effects of different economic policies such 
as the interest rate policy that can be considered as an exogenous variable in this context, 
and/or to incorporate some restrictions on the relations between the macroeconomic variables 
that can arise from theory or judgment.
31
 They further suggest, as a promising way forward, 
an alternative combined approach, wherein the central projection is given by some external 
forecast, while the VAR is used only to obtain a correlation matrix for the joint distribution of 
the errors. They evaluate advantages and disadvantages of different ways of using fan charts 
analyses, classifying them into:1) VAR approach, 2) External Forecast, 3) External Forecast 
with correlated errors and 4) Weighted Projections. 
32
  
 
Figure A-2 in the Appendix 1 reproduces, for illustrative purposes, the fan charts produced at 
the IADB for Uruguay, using these four methods.  It shows, as noted above, that the projected 
paths in fan charts lose progressively its predictive ability as the forecasting period lengthens 
in all cases, though the charts shown here only cover a five year period. It should also be 
noted that data requirements for the fan charts analysis are generally demanding, which 
points to some difficulty in applying to LICs compared to MICs. Furthermore, it is known 
that econometric analyses using a VAR or its variations are more suited when higher-
frequency data are applied.  
 
Indeed, as Wyplosz (2007) notes, there is some trade-off between complexity and simplicity 
in the choice of econometric techniques. His warning against going down in a direction of 
using unnecessarily complex techniques and demanding computational task should be noted.  
 
III.2.3. Reappraisal of the concepts of “debt Sustainability” 
 
In fact, Wyplotz (2007) regards any analysis of debt sustainability as a ―mission impossible‖, 
suggesting that the concept of debt sustainability is so elusive and illusory for policy purpose 
that it may be better to use instead ―debt distress avoidance‖ as policy objective. Referring to 
the ―trade-offs‖ between complexity and simplicity, he discusses, on the merit of its 
simplicity,  the approach of computing the debt-stabilizing primary balance as addressing the 
debt sustainability question, as in Blanchard et al. (1990) and Buiter (1985). The starting 
point of their approach is an alternative definition of ‗debt sustainability‘, in which debt is 
considered to be sustainable when a debt burden indicator is not expected to follow an 
explosive path over time, since a debt is sustainable if it is not on a non-increasing trend. The 
objective of the computation of the debt-stabilising primary balance is to stabilize the debt at 
a chosen level deemed more desirable. Since debt dynamics are closely governed either by 
the external current account primary balance or the fiscal primary balance, as expressed in 
Equation (2) and Equation (4) in the Appendix 2 respectively, the focus should be on 
stabilising the level of these primary balances in order to keep current debt stable. Wyplosz 
notes that in this approach to debt sustainability, the debt path is a target, while the primary 
account is the instrument in terms of macroeconomic policy analyses. 
 
He uses an example of such an exercise wherein the objective is to maintain the debt ratio at 
its pre-shock level of 2005, assuming a 30 % depreciation shock in 2005, shown in Fig 4-a 
below, reproduced from Figure 3 in Wyplosz (2007) for ease of comparative illustration. This 
                                                 
31  It can be noted in passing, however, that structural VARs are not universally accepted as a robust method for 
macroeconomic policy analyses yet, as they are very sensitive to specifications of structural models and restrictions placed. 
32  See Table1 in Arizala et al (2008). 
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chart is the one drawn following the procedure laid out in the current DSAs. This is depicted 
as an ―original‖ scenario in the next two charts (Fig 4- b&c), reproduced from Figure 5 in 
Wyplosz (2007) which is used for discussing the debt-stabilising-primary-balance approach.  
In terms of contemplating policy responses, if the aim is to reduce the debt ratio promptly, 
policy makers are required to produce a large primary surplus immediately. This is shown in 
Fig 4-b & c under ―Stabilized 1‖ policy option.  Fig 4-c shows that fully stabilizing the debt 
requires a huge primary account improvement immediately when the depreciation suddenly 
increases the domestic currency value of the external debt. This tightening is relaxed over 
time when price increases catch up with depreciation. Wyplosz considers another possibility 
under ―Stabilized 2‖ policy option, where the debt is allowed initially to rise first but is aimed 
at returning to its 2005 level gradually by the end of the planning period, in this case in 2010. 
This shows that the least disruptive way of adjusting to shocks is to achieve a primary surplus 
that remains constant over the planning the period, as in ―Stabilized 2‖ in Fig. 4 b & c. Under 
the latter scenario, the primary balance now increases moderately, even though the shock is 
unusually violent, allowing an initial jump in the debt ratio.  
 
Figure 4.  Comparative Analysis of Policy Responses 
(a)  Simulated Paths of the Debt-to-GDP Ratio under DSA 
 
 
Source: Fig.3 in Wyplosz (2007) 
 
 
Fig. 4 (b) and (c).  Debt Stabilising Primary Balance 
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Source: Fig. 5 in Wyplosz (2007) 
 
In our view, this computational approach provides us a forum for a more meaningful dialogue 
over policy options to effect adjustment paths upon shocks between borrowers and lenders in 
their joint exercises of the debt sustainability analysis with regards to impacts of various 
shocks. As Wyplosz demonstrates through the diagram that time permitting, even very large 
debt shocks can be dealt with through moderate primary account corrections, as a moderately 
sustained primary account correction produces a large cumulative effect of reducing the debt 
ratio over time under the ―Stabilized 2‖ option. This option is of course more acceptable 
economically and politically, since it avoids a massive spending contraction which is bound 
to result in a severe recession. This also indicates that temporary shocks could be dealt with 
policies that spread adjustment costs over time. There is no need to raise serious concerns 
over the jump in debt levels resulting from shocks originally, if sovereign borrowers are 
allowed adequate time to adjust.   
 
Importantly, this points to the need for a new facility to deal with shocks facing LICs. If upon 
shocks critical contingent financing is available to make adjustments palatable as possible, 
the debt level can be kept under control, while avoiding a sharp contraction in aggregate 
demand to produce a primary balance surplus in a short time framework. Given official 
liquidity made available immediately upon shocks through such a contingent facility, 
sovereign borrowers could then focus on achieving development objectives. However, if a 
shock proves ex-post to be more permanent, in order to sustain development spending and 
support investment, LICs with structural handicaps would require supplementary 
development aid in addition to the contingent credit line (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2008). 
 
In this context, Vaggi and Prizzon (2009) also discuss the long run sustainability of external 
debt for LICs, using a similar analytical approach to the one that Wyplosz deployed above 
with a focus on dynamic paths of non-interest current account balance (nica), interest rate and 
growth rates in the framework of the ―Geometry of Debt Sustainability (GDS)‖.  They 
emphasise the importance of a deeper appreciation of the fact that for LICs with a narrow 
export base, moving from a deficit position to a surplus one in ‗nica’ implies a process of 
29 
 
structural change, requiring much longer lead time. Therefore, while debt restructuring or 
cancelation would provide an important relief in short-run, any discussion about debt 
sustainability for LICs should take a long run view of economic development process, 
involving the attainment of human development targets and or other objectives detailed in 
MDGs or post –MDGs targets. 
 
In Section V below, we shall return to this issue again when we discuss the imperative for 
instituting a new contingent financing facility in the face of exogenous shocks with a view to 
making debt instruments to work truly for economic development of LICs.    
III.3. Missing analysis of dynamics among components of total debt in the DSAs 
 
In the pre-Review DSAs, the sustainability analysis of external and public debt is conducted 
independently and in parallel, while a country is assigned one of the four debt distress ratings 
based solely on the basis of its forward-looking external public debt indicators relative to 
respective thresholds. In the past, LIC‘s external debt was predominantly public debt, while 
public debt was mostly external debt. So the focus on external public debt may have been 
judged as adequate for sustainability analysis of sovereign debt, seen from a point of external 
debt for managing the primary external balance on the one hand, and from that of public debt 
for managing the primary fiscal balance on the other. Thus, the traditional dominance by 
official concessional loans both in external debt and public debt in LICs could be a rationale 
for emphasising the risks associated with external public debt while recognising the 
importance of domestic debt more generally.  
 
Thus, for example, domestic debt was not included in the pre-Review DSA exercises. This 
was justified in the past due to the marginal share of borrowing from domestic debt markets 
in public debt in LICs in general. However, as Panizza (2007 and 2010) notes, this situation 
has been changing rapidly during the past decade in several large LICs, including those in 
Africa. Domestic debt has increased its share in public debt in these countries. Furthermore, 
he also points to the newly imaging situations, whereby non-resident purchases of domestic 
public and private debt have become non-negligible. This would lead to a fear that these 
countries are now exposed to the risk of a sudden shift in investor sentiment, followed by 
instability in the domestic financial market and the associated risk of difficulties in managing 
domestic debt. The latter issue is very much what a large number of advanced and emerging 
countries are forced to grapple with in the aftermath of the global financial crises and this 
topic is hotly debated among economists.  
 
Further, as private debt denominated in foreign currencies has to be treated as a contingent 
liability, which governments have to assume at times of non-payment, it should be 
incorporated in an analysis where public debt management is discussed. As Panizza (2010) 
emphasises, under these circumstances the distinction between domestic and external debt as 
well as between public and private debt will become blurred and hazy. Accordingly, debt 
management will become much more complicated in LICs with the emerging need to address 
the question on debt structures and compositions in terms of maturities and currency 
denominations. 
 
Indeed, an option to turning to domestic debt as a financial instrument for fiscal management 
has opened up in several LICs with deepening of domestic debt markets, while the prospects 
of accessing international capital markets have significantly improved on account of better 
growth performance of many African countries, as discussed in Section IV below. While this 
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emerging situation is often embraced as positive development reflecting a wider and due 
recognition by investors and markets of the potential of African economies, it has also given 
rise to fears that domestic public debt and external private debt can develop its own negative 
dynamics, leading to vulnerability and fragility. Compared to official external debt with high 
concessionality, these debt instruments carry much elevated costs of servicing with higher 
interest rate payments and shorter maturities attached.   Given this, the recent Review 
recommends deepening the analysis of sustainability of total debt all inclusive of domestic 
public debt and private external debt and associated fiscal vulnerability.  
 
Yet, the emphasis of the Review‘s recommendation in this area is placed more on deriving 
definite benchmarks of total public debt, as the case in the current analysis of external public 
debt, leading to assigning a risk distress rating relative to the CPIA-centred, standardised 
thresholds at the end of each DSA exercise.
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  Having gathered domestic debt data spanning 
several decades covering 123 countries, of which 81 are classified as LICS, they carried out 
empirical exercises similar to those reported in Kraay and Nehru (2004,2006) and IMF 
(2004a) reviewed in Section II.3 above, and produced the following results of the implied 
CPIA dependent total public debt sustainability thresholds (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. CPIA-determined total public debt thresholds 
 
 
Source: IMF/World Bank (2012) 
 
However, whilst the focus is placed on producing a ―scientific‖ basis for arriving at debt 
distress ratings on the basis of CPIA-centred benchmarks for total debt in the Review, what is 
critical is to examine emerging interrelationships among different components of total debt. 
As discussed in the Three-Gap model developed and discussed extensively by Bacha (1990) 
and Taylor (1988 and 1991), an analysis of dynamic interactions among three main 
macroeconomic imbalances facing developing countries – the external current account 
imbalances, the fiscal imbalances and the saving-investment balance – is of critical 
importance.  In their framework, three gaps identified as a separately distinguishable binding 
constraint are seen explicitly as interacting closely with one other endogenously to engender 
an economy‘s adjustment path in response to various shocks. Once the parameters are not 
considered as fixed,
34
 ex ante gaps in all the three sectors reveal themselves as not truly 
independent as Maizels (1968) notes in relation to the original two gaps model. Then, both 
                                                 
33 . Since high levels of private external debt are observed in only a few LICs, the Review suggested to take a country-
specific approach rather than including it in estimation of benchmarks of debt distress rating of total debt for the time being. 
34 . Easterly‘s criticism of the financial gap model in (1999b) is basically directed at the gap model‘s uncritical adoption of 
the assumption of the fixed relationships between key parameters as found in the original Harrod-Domar growth model. 
However, this has been for long and widely recognized as one of the drawbacks of the model. The gap models should be 
instead treated as a macroeconomic analysis of the disequilibrium adjustment process as in Taylor (1988 and 1991). Then, 
they can serve as a useful analytical tool for examining various adjustment policy options. 
. 
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the two-gap and the three gap-models could serve as a tool for macroeconomic policy 
analysis of the disequilibrium adjustment process as found in Taylor‘s discussion of the 
three-gap model (1988 and 1991). 
 
The necessary ex ante adjustments are by no means either spontaneous or painless, whether 
achieved through the market mechanism or through government policies. As Chenery and 
Strout (1966) emphasize, there is no automatic mechanism to equate the gaps, and the process 
of closing the gaps is, in essence, a disequilibrium adjustment process. Taylor (1988 and 
1991) shows that while in theory there are several mechanisms by which the gaps between 
the three gaps can be closed in the wake of exogenous shocks, the growth rate is an 
endogenous adjustment variable in all his eighteen case-study countries. 
 
In stress tests carried out in the pre-Review DSAs, not much explicit and detailed discussion 
on what possible adjustment paths could be taken when countries are faced with various 
shocks, and the projected debt burden might set for an unstable or, worse, explosive, path. 
Such events to either of the two primary balances or both would make dynamics of domestic 
and external debt unsustainable through interactive adjustment processes. As the DSF is 
meant for monitoring debt dynamics as well as for serving as a toolkit in policy dialogues 
between sovereign borrowers and official lenders, an analysis of the two balances and the two 
debt dynamics projected initially separately should be integrated and thoroughly discussed. 
For this, the approach of computing the debt-stabilizing primary balance to debt 
sustainability discussed above in Section III.2.3 and illustrated in Figure 4-b&c could be 
invaluable for understanding policy options in adjusting to shocks as well as examining feed-
back reactions between the two dynamics.        
 
Referring to Keynes‘s infamous ―transfer problem‖ thesis, UNCTAD (2010) discusses the 
importance of understanding different implications of domestic debt mainly with a budgetary 
implication and external debt with a payment implication in foreign currencies. Hence, it 
emphasises that developing countries who cannot issue external debt obligation in its own 
currency, have to develop the capacity to cover international obligations on a net basis (i.e. 
without creating new debt).   A country can make payments from income streams generated 
by internationally tradable goods and services only in sustained presence of a current account 
surplus. The two- gap model referred to above is developed precisely on the recognition of 
this critical premise. Hence, real exchange rates are a critical adjustment mechanism for 
ensuring for management of the current account balance. 
 
At the same time, the UNCTAD Report goes on to discuss why a full analysis of interactions 
and linkages between external and fiscal sustainability is vital. In particular, it stresses the 
importance of understanding the critical policy trade-off in the adjustment mechanisms 
arising from these interactions: a real devaluation is a necessary condition for restoring 
external sustainability but since a large share of external public debt in developing countries 
is denominated in foreign currencies, a large devaluation can lead to a sudden jump in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio.  This implies that ―a currency appreciation can jointly have a positive 
effect on fiscal sustainability and a negative effect on external sustainability‖ (UNCTAD 
2010: 63). Yet, as it notes, if a rapid deterioration of the current account develops, the 
improvement in fiscal conditions is temporary and that this trade-off also implies that 
allowing currency devaluation in presence of foreign currency public debt may lead to a debt 
crisis on the fiscal front. Hence, exchange rate movements have to be carefully managed, 
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taking into account this potential trade-off in ensuring debt sustainability with an eye on the 
development of both external and internal balances.
35
  
 
A switch to domestic borrowing in public debt management can reduce the policy trade-off of 
this kind, but also lead to another well-known trade-off between inflation targets and 
domestic debt management for attaining domestic macroeconomic balances. This is again the 
precise issue addressed in the three-gap model by incorporating a fiscal gap into the analysis. 
We should also note that the first policy trade-off arising from the impacts of exchange rate 
movements on the external and internal balances is not eliminated by the switch to domestic 
debt altogether. What matters is the relative expected rate of changes in exchange rates and 
domestic prices. As Wyplosz (2007) note, ―if the exchange rate depreciates faster than prices, 
foreign currency debt becomes more expensive in domestic currency. The same happens 
when the interest rate on domestic currency debt increases by more than the inflation rate. 
Debt service becomes heavier. Conversely, when interest and exchange rates fail to fully 
reflect expected inflation and the debt is not indexed and in domestic currency, rising 
inflation temporarily reduces the cost of borrowing.‖ 
 
In the pre- Review DSAs, much meaningful discussions are not conducted on these crucial 
issues altogether by missing an analysis of interactions between external and public 
sustainability and associated policy adjustment questions into its analytical framework. As 
discussed below in Section III.5, this question takes rightly one of central places in the new 
DSAs conducted with use of the DGE model.  
III.4. Adjustments to Scaling factors and Interpretation of Discount Rates   
 
Following on the recommendation of the earlier review, the recent Review has also proposed 
to adjust debt burden indicators of debt/exports ratios by including growing remittances and 
official international reserve holdings into a denominator of debt burden indicators. 
Naturally, debt burden indicators should reflect, as accurately as possible, a country‘s all 
inclusive income flows such as private transfers or official reserve holdings that are available 
for debt service payments.   
 
Discussions on the discount rate in the DSF- another scale factor to debt burden indicators- 
remain conducted purely as a technical matter as to which rate should be selected for 
calculating the present value (PV) of debt. The present value (PV) of debt is the discounted 
sum of all future principal and interest (at + it) at a given discount rate (β). That is: 
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From this it is clear that debt for LICs is concessional, since its PV is always lower than the 
face nominal value, because the contractual interest rate is very low, usually lower than the 
discount rate applied.
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 Hence, in the DSF the use of PV in calculating debt burden indicators 
in place of the nominal value is justified on the grounds that it can account for the 
concessionality of debt by applying an appropriate discount rate. It is also argued that the use 
                                                 
35 . The classical tension between policy instruments and targets for attaining the internal and external balances is well 
known, and extensively discussed in text books on open economy macroeconomics. This is also addressed in the three-gap 
model by applying an analysis of disequilibrium adjustments in a dynamic context.  
36 . Strictly speaking, the net present value should be used for measuring a country‘s debt profile. However, a simple PV is 
calculated in DSAs on account of the limited data availability for the NPV, while gross figures are more readily available.  
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of PV allows for a slower pace for contribution of debt-creating flows to output and export 
growth. After taking into account other elements of concessionality such as the grace period, 
the maturity and the frequency of payments to calculate effective interest rates charged on 
debt instruments, the PV is regarded as a critical element for calculating the grant element 
(GE) as: 
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In this respect, a question arises as to the discount rate appropriate for calculating the PV in 
DSF. Currently, in the DSF, the US dollar CIRR (commercial interest reference rate; six 
month average) is applied as a uniform discount rate for all LICs. It is adjusted regularly 
according to the rule that the discount rate should be adjusted whenever it deviates from the 
CIRR by at least 100 basis points for a period of six consecutive months (IMF and World 
Bank, 2009).
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This global commercial reference rate is selected as a discount rate to an official concessional 
debt, since it reflects a shadow interest rate for sovereign borrowers, if they were to resort to 
non-concessional commercial loans for their development finance. Donors also insist on the 
use of a reference commercial rate, as the commercial rate reflects the opportunity cost of 
concessional lending from their perspective.
38
 The choice of such a commercial reference rate 
over an appropriate discount rate in the case of official loans has not been easily settled since 
there is hardly any secondary market for official concessional loans for providing a clear 
reference point, as opposed to the case of commercial sovereign debt instruments issued for 
Middle Income Countries and Emerging Market Economies.   
 
Certainly, from a sovereign borrower‘s perspective in the case of LICs, it may well be 
relevant to use other discount rates appropriate to understand the relative cost of debt burden 
at least as a comparator. A relevant discount rate from a perspective of macroeconomic 
management over a short-run can be domestic interest rates adjusted by inflation rates or the 
rate of currency appreciation/depreciation. Domestic rates are already factored in as interest 
rates in the case of domestic public debt. However, relative real domestic interest rates in 
relation to effective interests on external loans have become important for governments in 
making a choice between external debt vs domestic debt, since a number of governments of 
LICs started taking increasingly an option of issuing debt instruments for mobilising 
resources domestically as well as internationally, as discussed in Sections III.3 above and 
IV.1 below.  
 
This discussion demonstrates that there is a range of issues to consider for deciding which 
discount rates should be used in the debt sustainability analysis for productive and 
meaningful policy dialogue for making sovereign borrowing/lending decisions. In the DSF, 
the uniformity in the discount rate used in the DSAs across countries is given a higher order 
of importance over country specific discount rates which can take into account country 
specific circumstances such as reference domestic interest rates, exchange rates, inflation rate 
and stages of economic development. We suggest that alternative discount rates may be 
                                                 
37  This rule is said to strike a balance between the desire to insulate PV calculations from temporary noise  
38 . Cosíro-Pascal  (2010) notes that the use of the commercial rate such as CIRR is useful for creditor countries for a fair 
burden sharing of the debt rescheduling in Paris Club negotiations. 
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considered at least as a comparator for discussion and negotiation, since the degree of debt 
burden is influenced by the choice of discount rates for debt sustainability analysis. 
 
For now, we turn our discussions to the important  role of discount rates in the analysis of 
sovereign debt from a borrower‘s long-run developmental perspective, i.e. its key role in 
decision making of  inter-temporal resource allocation  rather than just for the use to reflect  a 
mere concessionality of official sovereign debt. This is because the discount rate used should 
also reflect a sovereign borrower‘s decision on how much weight the society places in 
aggregate on current enjoyment (consumption) against one in the future (investment) as a 
matter of inter-temporal resource allocation. In the theoretical borrowing/lending model as in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, shown in Fig.5, a country‘s inter-temporal allocation depends on 
the two parameters as reflected in a position and shape of indifference curves: the elasticity of 
inter-temporal substitution and the subjective discount rate. The former measures the 
sensitivity of the inter-temporal consumption allocation to an interest rate change, whilst the 
latter indicates the country‘s preference placed in future consumption against current 
enjoyment.  
 
Figure 5.  Intertemporal Borrowing Model 
 
 
 
Bearing such a model in mind, Easterly (1999a) characterises HIPCs as countries with a low 
inter-temporal elasticity and high discount rate. Interpreting the two parameters basically as 
the society‘s choice variable, he argues that a country chooses a set of ‗wrong‘ economic 
policies, which gives rise to a low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution and high discount 
rate. In particular, governments are seen as having a higher discount rate than private agents, 
due to the uncertainty of tenure and lower concern for future generations of governments. 
Thus, according to him, governments in HIPCs typically exhibit a tendency to run-down 
country‘s net assets as a result of the combination of asset decumulation and liability 
accumulation on the part of politicians in power. Hence, in his view, firstly, a country gets 
into a heavily indebted position out of its own choice. Second, these two key behavioural 
parameters are assumed to be unchanged after debt relief, unless a country actually 
implements ‗policy reforms‘, which are packaged by the donor community    
 
Surely, Easterly‘s account of ―predatory‖ behaviour of governments/political leaders may fit 
a number of the cases among HIPCs. However, a generalisation is always dangerous. Further, 
we question Easterly‘s one-sided interpretation of the origin of the debt crisis in HIPCs in 
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both conceptual and empirical aspects.
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 At the conceptual level, his treatment of the 
behavioural parameters as a reflection of permanent preference order of HIPCs‘, which could 
be changed only by adopting donors‘ reform packages, can be seriously challenged. 
Economic development processes should involve many structural changes, including a shift 
in several important behavioural parameters. One of the pressing issues we face today is why 
many donor-inspired reforms adopted as policy conditionality attached to concessional 
official aid to many LICs  since the mid-1980s, whether ex-post or ex-ante, have been rather 
slow to produce transformation of economic structures of African LICs to date. Today, many 
of them remain largely commodity dependent, and the recent high growth record of African 
countries are a lot to do with the resource boom commenced around 2002 in the face of 
rapidly increasing demand for a wide range of commodities from Asian Drivers such as 
China and India.
40
    
 
In contrast to Easterly‘s ―predatory-story‖ above, we suggest the structural characteristics of 
low-income economies, such as the low saving rate and the high discount rate, should be duly 
recognized as a manifestation of their stage of economic development rather than just that of 
subjective preference. Importantly, the high discount rate exercised by governments of LICs, 
and the resultant condition of liability accumulation may reflect their pressing need to address 
a large number of developmental bottlenecks through investment in economic and social 
infrastructures.  If high discount rates ―today‖ reflect these developmental imperatives facing 
governments in responding to demand from domestic stakeholders to address bottlenecks 
urgently, temporary liability accumulation should be viewed as a precondition for asset 
accumulation over time as part of development processes.   
 
III.5. Refinements to the DSAs with the Dynamic General Equilibrium Model as a 
consistent Macroeconomic framework 
 
In the pre-Review DSAs, the aspect of growth/development dividends expected from debt is 
significantly underplayed. Possible growth-enhancing effects of external borrowing are 
pushed aside into the background in the DSA‘s stressed tests. In a way, this may not be 
necessarily surprising as the DSF emerged after the IFIs and other donor governments finally 
conceded that a huge reduction, or cancellation, of official multilateral debt through the HIPC 
and MDRI initiatives was inevitable as the only viable exit option from the two-decade long 
debt crisis of LICs.  
 
The previous Review of the DSF carried out in 2009 acknowledged that the DSAs did not 
explicitly and sufficiently consider the role of investment in the growth-debt nexus in stress 
tests and requested the staff at the IFIs to examine the debt-investment-growth nexus 
(IMF/World Bank 2009).  In particular, in discussing the scaling-up scenarios from increased 
investment, the earlier IMF paper emphasises that in order to substantiate the claim of high 
growth dividends from investment, it is necessary to estimate the impact of additional public 
investment on other macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, exports and public 
revenues, which are denominators of the debt indicators (Barkbu et.al, 2008: 13). However, it 
also points to the need for exercising caution against excessive optimism placed on high 
growth dividends-scenario and urges also for constructing an alternative high-investment, 
low-growth scenario. In other words, they tend to lean towards conservative borrowing on the 
                                                 
39  See Nissanke (2010a). 
40  See Nissanke (2011 and 2012) and Kaplinsky (2010) for factors behind for the contemporary phase of commodity price 
super-cycle. 
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basis of empirical evidences indicating that historically prolonged growth accelerations are 
rare in LICs. 
 
Yet, such a pessimistic position, supposedly based on historical experiences, requires a 
careful reassessment in light of changing dynamics in African LICs over the past decade. 
Indeed, whether it is in the classical literature such as growth-cum-debt model, the debt cycle 
model, the gap model or in the neoclassical inter-temporal borrowing/lending model 
discussed above, all these theoretical models emphasise potential growth dividends to justify 
sovereign borrowing by developing countries.  In other words, LIC‘s sovereign debt should 
not result just from the need for financing temporary shortfalls in external and fiscal 
macroeconomic balances or consumption smoothing due to income shocks. Sovereign debt 
for LICs is rationalized on the ground that borrowing/lending is for financing development, 
that is, primarily to accelerate economic growth for facilitating the process of social-
economic development. Indeed, all multilateral agencies and institutions themselves exist on 
the mission of providing a continuous flow of development finance to developing countries. 
 
In responding to recurrent criticisms of the DSF for not adequately capturing the benefits of 
debt-financed public investment, the most recent Review recommend the use of an open 
economy Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) Model developed at IMF (Buffie et al, 2012) 
in order to shed a new insight into the investment-growth nexus for calibrating a debt burden 
profile in DSAs. The Review also suggests that this nexus is so important that it merits 
further work by integrating the two models developed by the World Bank into DSAs for 
gaining deeper understanding on this question. 
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The Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) Model has been developed to provide the DSAs 
with an internally consistent quantitative macroeconomic framework with focus on the public 
investment-growth nexus. That is, its objective is to examine the macroeconomic effects of 
public investment surges in LICs. Built for a coherent long-run, forward –looking debt 
sustainability analysis of effects of debt-led public investment scaling ups , it has a number of 
advantages over the previous DSAs, including : 1) it incorporates both public external and 
domestic debt accumulation in one unified model as opposed to a parallel analysis of each as 
in current DSAs; 2) it conducts analyses of fiscal policy reactions which are deemed 
necessary to ensure debt-sustainability and associated macroeconomic adjustments required 
for achieving internal and external balance.  
 
The model is an open economy two sector model (traded and non-traded sectors to allow an 
analysis of real exchange rates and TOT shocks) with three types of public sector debt 
(external concessional, external commercial and domestic debt) and three agents (firms, 
consumers and the government).  Incorporating a neoclassical production function with 
private and public capital, it allows public investment raise output directly but accompanied 
by both crowd-in and crowd-out effects on private investment.  It attempts to capture some of 
key features of a typical low-income country or a lower middle-income country on the basis 
of historical records observed in SSA. They include: i)  the limited absorptive capacity due to 
coordination problems or supply bottlenecks during the implementation phase of public 
                                                 
41 . They are the Maquette for MDG Simulations (MAMS) and Spatial Approach model.  The former quantifies investment 
levels needed to meet the MDGs, while the latter is used to assess proposed infrastructure investment plans by identifying 
priorities and formulating an adequate sequencing of projects.  
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investment projects ; ii) the low efficiency of public investment spending. assuming that 
spending on public investment does not lead to an equivalent increase in the stock of public 
capital because of the possibility of ―waste‖ or spending on projects with poor returns; iii) the 
slow response of the private sector, iv) the difficulty in adjusting taxes and spending, which is 
necessary for servicing debt in the face of limited, exogenously given aid and concessional 
funds available; v) the dominance of hand-to-mouth consumers; and vi) the limited access to 
international capital markets. 
 
Clearly, as a forward looking model for projecting debt sustainability over a long period, the 
DEG model goes a long way in answering previous concerns and criticisms raised in relation 
to technical weaknesses of the current DSAs. Within the confinement dictated by a particular 
construct of the DEG model and its associated assumptions, an incorporation of the DGE as a 
consistent macroeconomic model would enhance technical aspects involved in DSAs and 
enrich discussions of future policy options. As the predictions are made on the basis of a 
careful calibration of the model, it allows the assumptions underlying the projections clearer 
with respect to key parameters. Hence, as Buffie et.al (2012) emphasises, it could serve a 
richer menu to discuss different simulated scenarios; help apply empirical information, for 
example, on project rates of return; and allow more systematic risk assessments.
42
  It provides 
with a useful tool kit for making some informed decisions on opting for different financing 
mechanisms, since the DGE model allows for financing schemes that mix concessional, 
external commercial and domestic debt, while taking into account the impact of public 
investment on growth as well as constraints on the speed and magnitude of fiscal adjustment. 
 
Now, based on the results of a calibration of the DGE model to a data set of the average LIC 
under alternative policy scenarios, Buffie et al (2012) summarises their findings in the 
following points; 
  
1. Well-executed high-yielding public investment programs can substantially raise 
output and consumption and be self-financing in the long run, provided that certain 
conditions such as high returns on public capital, high public investment efficiency 
and high collection rates of user fees are met. Such conditions are often not present in 
LICs. 
2.  However, even if the long run looks good, transition problems can be formidable 
when concessional financing does not cover the full cost of the investment program. 
Absent additional borrowing or aid, the revenue gains from growth will not 
materialize soon enough to obviate the need for difficult fiscal adjustments on the 
transition path, especially when the scaling up is front-loaded. 
3. Covering the resulting gap with tax increases or spending cuts requires sharp 
macroeconomic adjustments, crowding out private investment and consumption and 
delaying the growth benefits of public investment.  
4. Covering the gap with domestic borrowing market is not helpful either: higher 
domestic rates increase the financing challenge, and private investment and 
consumption would be crowded out. 
5.  Supplementing with external commercial borrowing, on the other hand, can smooth 
these difficult adjustments. However, the strategy may be also risky. With poor 
execution, sluggish fiscal policy reactions, or persistent negative exogenous shocks, 
this strategy can easily lead to unsustainable public debt dynamics.  
                                                 
42
 . The model has been applied to Togo, Burkina Faso and Cape Verde. It is in the process of being applied to Cote 
d‘Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal.. 
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6. Front-loaded investment programs and weak structural conditions (such as low returns 
to public capital and poor execution of investments) make the fiscal adjustment more 
challenging and the risks greater. 
 
These findings from the simulation exercises have led them to side with the cautious stance 
over the policy debate on debt-led public investment scaling ups. The application of the DGE 
model to  the most recent DSA for Burkina Faso, for example, confirms this conservative 
bias in the advices given to its government with respect to its aspiration for public investment 
drive on account of the high probability of breaching the CPIA- determined debt thresholds in 
the debt to  export ratio in 2021. Naturally, these conclusions depend on a number of the 
assumptions made regarding the key parameters for calibration as well as on the construct of 
the DEG Model itself.  These results are also obtained from the calibration to the historical 
data series of macroeconomic variables or some average figures for SSA over the past 10-20 
years.  
 
Yet, strong demand for scaling up of public investment today, especially surge for 
infrastructural investment, comes from the imperatives to address structural bottlenecks 
found in LICs to facilitate the process of transformation of socio-economic structures and laid 
down a foundation for inclusive, broad based development. If infrastructure investment can 
indeed succeed in bringing about a major shift in economic structures, large externalities and 
high social returns within a relative short period as happened in East Asia in the 1980s and 
1990s, predictions made on historical data series may not be so informative. Hence, an 
interpretation of calibrated results on debt sustainability in a distant future should be made 
with this in mind, exercising a good judgement backed up by detailed country-specific 
knowledge.    
       
Therefore, while the refinement to the DSAs by application of the DGE model has created a 
better toolkit to guide discussions and negotiations on sovereign borrowing/lending on a 
much more informed basis, this by itself cannot give a basis for settling the dilemma facing 
policy makers in LICs over the scale and pace of acceleration of public investment against 
the fear of making debt unsustainable.  Rather, one can draw more subtle policy inferences 
from their calibration results of the DGE. First, their analyses and results, especially those 
from stress tests, point to the critically important role of the availability of concessional 
financing facilities at the time of repayment difficulties.  Debt can be made sustainable if an 
appropriate facility to deal with such a debt distress situation is in place, as discussed above.  
 
While their paper takes explicitly a position opposing to Wyplosz‘s view on debt 
sustainability, their finding actually concurs with the position taken by Wyplosz , who 
emphasises the need to approach to the issues related to sovereign debt management from a 
perspective of ―debt distress‖ management rather than chasing after an elusive concept of 
debt sustainability. It is apt to note here that in the context of stress tests of unexpected 
shocks, the results reported in Buffie et al (2012) confirm that additional concessional 
financing instead of external commercial loans at times of experiencing debt distress could 
greatly reduce the risks of debt becoming unsustainable. For example, the analysis of one of 
the stress tests shows that when an unexpected TOT shock hits the economy, additional 
concessional borrowing to finance the public investment surge, while setting caps in the tax 
adjustment, can ensure debt sustainability.  In their own words, ―(T)he crux of the matter is 
whether LICs can obtain additional aid in the event of adverse shocks‖ (Buffie et al, 2012:44). 
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Second, since their results confirm that debt sustainability of productive investment surge is 
critically dependent on the structural conditions in LICs, discussions should be more focused 
on improving these conditions by developing local institutions with a view of increasing the 
efficiency of public investment and the absorptive capacity. It is also important to ensure that 
infrastructure projects with high social returns are selected so that greater economy-wide spill 
over effects and externality can be achieved to spur the process of structural transformation, 
and that future revenues from infrastructure projects are secured to cover the recurrent 
maintenance and running costs. Thirdly, their comparative analysis of different financing 
schemes reveals a greater chance of experiencing an explosive debt path and associated fiscal 
vulnerability by resorting too much to non-concessional borrowing for scaling up productive 
investment and at times of payment difficulties.  With these pointers in mind, we shall now 
turn to discussions on the emerging patterns of sovereign borrowing since 2006 and why the 
scaling up for public investment is seen as imperative in African LICS.  
 
IV.  Emerging Patterns of Sovereign Borrowing and  Imperatives for Public 
Investment   
 
IV.1. Recent Evolution of Public Debt Profile and New Debt Instruments   
 
Fig. 6 shows that debt burden, measured as a ratio of external debt stock to exports, has 
steadily declined since the debt resolution trough the HIPC/MDRI process was implemented 
in SSA as a region, where all African LICs are located.  In Table A-1 of Appendix, where 
several main indicators of external debt profile of all African countries are presented
43
, 27 
countries are classified as LICs, while 12 countries are Lower Middle Countries (LMCs) and 
7 countries as Upper-Middle Countries (UMICs) in SSA.  In North Africa, two countries - 
Algeria and Tunisia - are classified as UMICs while three other countries (Djibouti, Egypt 
and Morocco are LMICs.     
 
Fig. 6 Trends in External Debt to exports and Reserves to debt for 2003-2011 
 
 
                                                 
43 . Data are taken from International Debt Statistics, 2013, World Bank. It does not cover some countries in Africa such as 
Libya. The cells marked in blue indicate that the ratios exceed the CPIA-determined thresholds. 
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Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics 2013, p.45. 
 
This downward trend in debt burden for the SSA region is also clearly shown in the IMF 
analyses of public debt burden (external and domestic debt combined) as shown here in Fig. 7 
(IMF, 2013). 
 
Fig.7.  Public sector debt  as percent of GDP for 44 SSA countries: 2000-12 
 
 
Source: Fig.2.1 in IMF (2013). 
 
These data indicate that countries in SSA reduced their debt burden significantly since 2006, 
and the recent global financial and economic crises erupted in September 2008 has not 
noticeably deteriorated their public debt positioons in the SSA region as a whole.  Fig. 8 
show changes in ratios of public debt to GDP in 2012 from those observed in 2007 for 
44countries in SSA.   
 
Turning to the debt burden indicators of individual countries Table A-1 taken from the World 
Bank data set, most countries did not breach  their CPIA-determined thresholds as measured 
in PV external debt to exports so far.
44
  9 countries among LMICs and LICs exceeded their 
respective thresholds, measured in external debt in PV terms to exports in 2011, as marked in 
blue in Table A-1. They are Djiburti, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Brundi, Comoros, 
Eriteria, Guinea, Mauritania, Zimbabwe. However, none of SSA countries have shown any 
distress in their ability to cover debt service payments by exports in 2011. Two countries, Sao 
Tome and Principe and Brundi, who had higher debt service ratio than their respective 
threasholds set for the CPIA score in 2006, did reduce this ratio significantly by 2011. Hence, 
this confirms that the debt situations in LMICs and LICs do not raise any serious concerns as 
in 2011, when their country-specific thresholds are applied.  
 
This overall picture is indeed confirmed by the most recent analysis of public debt, covering 
both external and domestic debt, of SSA countries (IMF 2013). Fig.8 shows changes in 
public sector debt as % of GDP between  2007 and 2012. Only two countries- Senegal 
(LMIC) and Mozambique (LIC)- whose debt stock was just over 20  % of GDP in 2007,  
increased debt to GDP by around  20 % for these five years. The increase in Senegal is 
accounted for more by the rise in domestic debt, while that of Mozambique is explained by 
increase in external debt (Fig.9).  The increase of public debt of most countries is limited to 
                                                 
44  The CPIA determined debt burden indicators are expressed in ratios to GDP, exports and revenue, but the World Bank 
data reports as ration to GNI rather than GDP. So here we discuss bleach of ratios to exports rather than GDP.  
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5-15 % of GDP, while five countries (Lethoto, Rwanda, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Ethippia) 
managed to  reduce their ratio of total public debt to GDP for these five years.  
 
Fig.8. Changes in Public Sector Debt as percentage of GDP between 2007 and 2012 
 
Source: Fig.2.3 in IMF(2013) 
 
Fig.9 reproduces the IMF analysis of public debt burden in relation to GDP in 2012 against 
their DSF thresholds for PRGT-eligible countries and against calibrated thresholds for both 
PRGT-eligible and PRGT non-eligible countries. The calibrated thresholds are obtained from 
a more conservative assumption regarding the probability of experiencing debt distress (10 % 
of probability) than the DSF. Hence, the latter is a more stringent criterion for judging the 
probability of debt distress. The calibrated thresholds for PRGT eligible countries are set at 
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34, 47 and 60 % depending on the CPIA score. For non-PRGT eligible countries the uniform 
rate of 43 % is used as thresholds, similar to that applied for emerging market economies in 
the IMF‘s fiscal analysis. 
 
Fig.9 Public Sector Debt in 2012 and Debt Sustainability Thresholds 
 
Source: Fig.2.4 in IMF (2013) 
 
According to Fig. 9 and the analysis reported in IMF (2013- REO), of the 33 PRGT-eligible 
countries considered, three countries ( Cape Verde, the Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe) 
have 2012 debt-to-GDP levels that exceed the DSF thresholds, whereas 10 countries exceed 
the more conservative calibrated thresholds. Of the nine non-PRGT-eligible countries, 
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Mauritius and South Africa are beyond or near 43% of thresholds, but their debt is dominated 
by domestic debt. At the same time, many PGRT-eligible countries started having an 
increasing portion of their public debt in domestic debt. 
 
Overall, IMF (2013) summarises the findings of the most recent DSAs for 33 low-income 
countries as follows: 
• 14 countries are deemed to be at low risk of experiencing external debt distress; 
• 14 countries are deemed to be at moderate risk of experiencing external debt distress under 
some adverse scenarios; 
• 5 countries (Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe) are currently deemed to be at high risk of debt distress. 
 
After examining the projected debt profile to 2017, IMF (2013) concludes that except these 
five countries listed above and those projected to be at moderate risk, ―current (or projected) 
debt levels do not constrain temporary financing of expanded budget deficits in most low-
income countries ―(IMF 2013: 31). 
 
Now, over recent years, several so-called ―frontier‖ countries in Africa, including some of 
LICs, started raising capital from international capital markets by issuing sovereign bonds. 
Fig. 10 and Table 4 shows the recent issues reported in IMF (2013).
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Fig. 10. Recent Sovereign Bond Issues of countries in SSA 
 
 
Source Fig. 3.1, IMF (2013) 
.  
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 . Though it is on increase, IMF (2013) estimates that at end-2011, sub-Saharan Africa‘s total international bonds 
outstanding reached only about 0.25 percent of the stock of outstanding international bonds issued by emerging market 
countries and advanced countries and it is just 0.02 percent if South Africa is excluded.    
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Table 4. Terms and other features of Sovereign Bonds issued by SSA countries   
 
. 
Source Table 3.1 in IMF (2013) 
   .  
11 countries which issued sovereign bonds listed in Figure 10 are the Republic of Congo, 
Côte d‘Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Zambia.
46
  These countries issued bonds for a variety of reasons: 1) Ghana, Senegal and 
Zambia issued bonds for financing economic infrastructure in the energy and transport 
sectors; 2) Nigeria and South Africa have issued international sovereign bonds to provide a 
benchmark for (other) governments and corporate bond markets by providing information for 
assessing the yield spread at which their foreign currency debt is traded, and served as a 
reference for international corporate bond issues; 3) Seychelles, Gabon, Republic of Congo 
and  Côte d‘Ivoire  issued international bonds in the context of debt restructuring.   
 
Not only do these bonds carry considerable currency risk, but these debt instruments offered 
on commercial terms are much more expensive over concessional borrowing in all terms such 
as yields, spreads and bond types. The spread of these bonds ranges between 372 and 600 
basis points, while maturity spans from 5 to 10 years, except in the case of Republic of 
Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire and Seychelles which issued bonds for restructuring purposes (Table 4). 
There are reports that yields and spreads have come down noticeably from the initial offer 
levels observed in several cases in the recent past.
47
  However, although the cost currently 
attached is not prohibitively high under the prevailing global environments of historically low 
interest rates, there is a risk of steeply escalating costs, as soon as interests start edging up 
and investors‘ risk appetites shift abruptly. Therefore, there is no doubt that raising of funds 
through sovereign bonds issues carries a high cost, considerably higher than those available 
through concessional windows. This can be clearly seen when these terms are compared with 
those available from the IDA (Table 5).  The standard IDA credit offered to LICs  are payable 
                                                 
46 More recently, Rwanda also raised financing by issuing sovereign bonds. 
47 This may also indicate some mispricing of these bonds at too high levels at issue.   
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over 40 years with a 10 year grace period with calculated grant elements of 62 % at 6% 
discount rates, while blend term credit to LMICs is payable over 25 years with a 5-year grace 
period with calculated grant elements of 35 %.   
 
Furthermore, even among debt instruments, bonds can be a more expensive instrument for 
financing infrastructure projects compared with loan contracts structured tailored for specific 
projects. Bond contracts can entail additional ‗carry costs‘, and lack often flexibility. As the 
history of sovereign debt restructuring processes is littered with difficult and costly 
negotiations, and internationally accepted, orderly workout mechanisms of sovereign bonds 
are yet to establish. Hence, restructuring sovereign bonds with private bond holders can be a 
very lengthy and costly exercise for LMICs and LICs at times of payment difficulties in 
future.  
 
Information on precise terms of loans provided by emerging partners such as China, Brazil, 
Turkey, India etc. is not so easily obtainable. For example, the details of the actual negotiated 
terms of the contracts, and in particular the shadow relative prices used in the calculations for 
long-term barter arrangements implicit in China‘s ―resources for infrastructure‖ contracts, are 
not disclosed. Hence it is difficult to ascertain the actual distributional outcome from these 
deals between the contracting parties, including the benefits accruing to Chinese companies 
and stakeholders in Africa respectively. According to Foster et al (2007), the contract terms 
appear to be subject to periodic revisions, so the contracting parties are not necessary locked 
rigidly into the prices and terms initially negotiated. It also reports that Chinese preferential 
loans charge on average an interest rate of 3.6 %, with a grace period of 4 years and a 
maturity of 14 years. If these are the terms used in Chinese loan contracts, this amounts to a 
grant element of less than 25 % (which is the minimum required for an agreement to be 
classified as official aid according to the OECD-DAC definition of aid). However, this cannot 
be easily verified, as the terms of each contract are usually left opaque and not disclosed. It is 
also known that the degree of concessional elements is not uniform, with some variations 
observed depending on projects.   
 
Table 5 Lending Terms of IDA 
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With concessional borrowing from MDBs and RDBs far dominating, LICs in SSA still 
benefit from contracting most debt in their generous terms. This is reflected in terms of new 
commitments of debt to most of LICs for 2006-2011 on average and those obtained in 2011, 
as shown in Fig.11 a&b.  These can be compared specifically to terms available in private 
debt in general for selected LICs, shown in Fig.12 a&b.
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  Clearly, borrowing from sources 
that offer high concessional terms plays a vital role in making LICs‘ debt much more 
manageable than otherwise.  
 
However, resources available for concessional borrowing are limited and likely to be 
constrained or cut sharply given the scale of fiscal problems facing traditional donor 
governments. These traditional financial sources are seen to be grossly inadequate for filling 
the huge infrastructure deficits in the region. A temptation is very strong for resorting to less 
concessional debt instruments when demand for public investment scaling up is so high.
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48 . For comparison, terms of new commitments of external public and private debt for African LMICs and UMICs are 
presented in the Appendix. 
49 In relation to Regional Member Countries eligible for the African Development Fund (AfDF-RMCs) Martin (2013) 
presents a summary of their borrowing profile to date in the following points: 1) overall external borrowing trebled since 
2000 to UA20 billion in 2012, of which UA 993 million is from the AfDF; 2) ODA (bilateral, multilateral and global 
funds) rose by 50% since 2000 to UA22 bn in 2012, but fell  more than 9% in real terms in 2010-12 and will stagnate in 
2013-16; 3)concessional and non-concessional loans provided by emerging partners through South-South Cooperation 
trebled since 2000, UA7 billion to Africa  in 2011, and expected to rise further; 4) with renewed creditworthiness of African 
countries, these countries have accessed to a number of funding sources available on commercial terms through issuing 
bonds over UA 1 bn, bank loans about 1bn, public-private partnerships of over 5 bn, and increased domestic borrowing 
over5 bn. N.B. UA stand for the Unit of Account used at the African Development Bank for the AfDF facility for 
disbursement. One UA is equivalent to one Special Drawing Right (SDR) of IMF, which is around 1.5 US $. 
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Figure 11-a&b.  Terms of New Commitments of external public debt (Average 2006-
2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.12 a&b Terms of New Commitments of private external debt available to LICs  
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IV.2. The Debt –Investment -Growth nexus revisited – A Comparative 
Perspective with East Asia 
There is no doubt that LICs in Africa are at a critical historical juncture. It is blessed with 
new opportunities hitherto rarely available throughout their post-independent years, while 
challenges facing policy-makers how to seize upon the new opportunities for turning 
optimism into reality are equally daunting. Key to realizing their development aspiration lies 
in the question whether they can facilitate the process of structural transformation by 
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increasing in both the scale and efficiency of productive investment. There is universal 
acknowledgement of the urgent needs to scale up investments and address enormous 
infrastructure gaps the continent faces. Indeed, productive investment is a critical link in the 
debt-growth nexus, as we know it.  
 
In the wake of on-going sovereign debt crises in almost all developed and emerging 
economies in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-9, a heated 
debate has been taking place among economists regarding the debt-growth nexus. Among 
many, Krugman (2010) questions the causal interpretation of the correlation analysis between 
growth and debt found in the influential papers by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010 a and b) on this 
topic.
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  Challenging the causality running from high debt to low growth implied in these 
papers, Krugman suggests that causation can well run from collapsing growth to high debt 
rather than the other way around, citing episodes of high debt and low growth such as 
observed in Japan since the late 1990s. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010 c) clarify and reiterate their early cross-country empirical analyses 
based on newly compiled data on forty-four countries spanning about two hundred years, 
which covers both advanced countries and emerging countries. They summarise their 
findings that:  i) the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for 
debt/GDP ratios below 90% of GDP; ii) though arbitrary judgments are involved in 
determining debt burden thresholds, they settle these at around 90 % where nonlinearities in 
the debt-growth link are found; iii) while severe economic downturns would lead to higher 
debt/GDP levels contemporaneously and/or with a lag, a unilateral causal pattern from low 
growth to high debt, does not accord with the evidence; iv) the reverse causation from high 
government debt leading to lower growth is more likely.
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 However, as Krugman suggests, 
the evidences of high correlations they produced cannot be used for discussing the causation. 
Subsequently, a number of serious methodological and technical flaws were discovered in 
their empirical studies analyses used to establish the debt burden thresholds. Hence, the 
empirical findings by Reinhart and Rogoff are no longer regarded as credible. Yet, until this 
fatal weakness was widely reported through media in May 2013, their findings have been a 
critical reference widely used world-wide by those urging for austerity measures in dealing 
with public debt.  
 
In reality, historical evidences point to two-way causation in growth-debt dynamics. Once a 
negative feed-back loop sets in the growth-debt nexus, it is very hard to get a momentum of 
economic growth restored as a heavy debt burden leads to a severe curtailment in productive 
investment. In fact, one of the most illustrative episodes of the existence of two-way 
causation in a negative feed-back loop is found in the protracted ‗debt overhang‘ condition 
many LICs had to endure in the 1980s and 1990s. Debt overhang is defined as the situation 
where outstanding debt is so large that investment will be inefficiently low without a sizeable 
reduction in debt stock or debt service payments (Claessens and Diwan 1989).  
 
Claessens and Diwan (1989) identify two effects of the debt overhang on investment and 
growth: the liquidity effects and incentive effects. The former refers to the condition in which, 
given the burden of large external debt with extremely scarce liquidity around, both capital 
formation and consumption reach a minimum level after years of austerity and low income 
                                                 
50 Krugman first  made this point in his New York Times Opinion Column on 11th August, 2010. 
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 See Pattillo et.al (2011) for cross-country regression analyses which examine the non-linear impact of external debt on 
growth, using panel data of 91 developing countries. They suggest that the average impact of debt becomes negative at about 
160-170 % of exports or 35-40% of GDP. 
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growth. The latter refers to the depressed level of both public and private investment for 
future growth, as a larger share of the future income stream is expected to be directed for 
resource transfer abroad. Thus, it is admitted that the two effects combined could push highly 
indebted countries into a downward spiral, which would further diminish both the debtor‘s 
willingness/commitment and capacity for debt payment.
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 This is not the best outcome for 
creditors either, since both creditors and debtors would lose out.  Clearly, under this condition 
we find a story of vicious circle in the growth-investment-debt nexus, i.e. the causality 
running from high debt via lower investment to lower growth as well as from lower growth 
via lower investment to higher debt and debt burden. This is exactly an opposite to the virtual 
circle of the debt induced growth emphasised in the earlier post-war literature on the debt-
cum growth model. 
 
Thus, the missing link in the debate on the two-way causalities in the growth-debt nexus in 
LICs is the paucity of productive investment, both private and public. Therefore, one of 
critical policy questions is how to ensure that sovereign borrowing is used productively for 
investment and development, and growth dividends are delivered definitely and on time. That 
is, the real challenge confronting the development community is how to raise both the rate 
and efficiency of investment financed through debt instruments in LICs. Naturally, 
―borrowed resources do not systematically deliver any growth bonus‖, as reminded by 
Wyplosz (2007:14).  However, as he continues to suggest, ―ignoring the conditions under 
which external borrowing can harm or boost growth amounts to asking the wrong question. If 
external borrowing is growth enhancing, the risk of over borrowing is small, possibly 
inexistent‖.  Hence, it is imperative to examine theoretically and empirically these conditions 
under which different outcomes come about by exploring in detail various debt-investment-
growth links in a country-specific context.  
 
Indeed, the low-equilibrium trap of high debt and low growth was particularly evident in 
Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. With the advent of the debt crisis in the 1980s, 
fiscal retrenchment (hence, reduced spending on public goods provision) was consistently 
pursued as part of the stabilization-cum-adjustment policies. Governments were generally left 
with little capacity and dwindling resources to implement development-oriented policies 
domestically and in particular, to undertake public investment on a sustained basis. Typically, it 
is large-scale infrastructure projects that get first axed in fiscal expenditure allocations at times 
of crises. In reality, the fiscal retrenchment at the height of the debt crisis in the 1980s was so 
deep that essential public goods provision in social infrastructure such as basic education and 
health expenditures were also axed and it was then assumed that these services could be 
provided on a fee-paying basis. This had often resulted in a fragile state with a seriously 
depleted and impaired institutional capability to deliver social services and to build physical and 
social infrastructure. Under these conditions, the scope and quality of public social services and 
infrastructure provision had progressively deteriorated.  
 
Particularly, the dwindling capacity to undertake public investment on the part of 
governments burdened with high debt resulted in their inability to promote and crowd-in 
private investment. The low level of both public and private investment combined had severe 
negative consequence for economic growth and development. In the absence of reliable public 
goods provisions, economic transactions in many LICs were conducted in highly uncertain and 
                                                 
52 . Several IMF working papers present cross country regressions analyses with a panel of developing countries to 
investigate the debt-growth nexus. For example, Cordella et al (2005) and Pattillo et.al (2004) carry out such an analysis 
respectively to investigate:  i) how the debt-growth relationship varies with indebtedness levels and other country 
characteristics; and ii) whether debt affects growth through factor accumulation or total factor productivity growth. 
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risky environments, which engender eminently volatile returns to investment and income 
streams. The high degree of uncertainty and instability is also known to have a powerful 
deterrent effect not only on the rate of private investment and economic growth but also on the 
composition of investment in favour of reversible and safe investments that have a self-insurance 
character. Thus, under such circumstances, safe and liquid assets are systematically chosen over 
less liquid but high-yielding assets. While wealthy segments of population may chose to invest 
abroad, resulting in substantial capital flights, other private investors chose to put their capital in 
short-term assets in sectors with relatively lower sunk costs and shorter turnover periods, such as 
trading, rather than in long-term physical investments. 
 
In fact, the political and economic environments in LICs tend to keep the economic activities 
of a significant proportion of private agents away from the "official" economy. Then, the so-
called informal economy has become an important source of employment and income for 
many households. In the absence of functioning formal institutions, economic activities tend 
to be restricted to small-scale production and local trade to obviate the contract enforcement 
problem through repeated dealing and cultural and social homogeneity. The majority of the 
poor, particularly the rural poor are often left behind. At the same time, a largely informal 
economy with a weak and narrow tax base reinforces the fiscal fragility. Hence, the poor 
public goods provision and the fragile fiscal condition develop its own loop of vicious circle 
for condemning an economy to a low equilibrium. These factors together have acted as a 
serious impediment to structural transformation of the economies of LICs.  
 
In parallel, the donor community had steadily reduced aid to economic infrastructure projects 
in relative to overall aid as well as to social infrastructures in SSA in the 1980sand 1990s. 
This is again in a sharp contrast to the experiences of developing countries in East Asia, 
where Japan- a major bilateral donor in the region during 1980s and 1990s- concentrated its 
aid on economic infrastructure development.
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  Fig. 13 A-B, Fig14 A-B and Fog.15 A-B 
display a historical trend of ODA allocations in SSA compared to East Asia. Fig.13 shows a 
trend in bilateral ODA allocated to both social and economic infrastructures in SSA and East 
Asia in current prices as percent of total ODA since the early 1970s. Clearly, there was a 
sharp decline of bilateral ODA going to economic infrastructure in SSA from late 1980s to 
mid 2000s in favour of social infrastructures (health and education spending), whereas 
economic infrastructure has consistently got a high share in bilateral aid allocation in total 
ODA as well as in relation to social infrastructure in East Asia. 
 
Fig. 13 Bilateral ODA allocated to social and economic infrastructures in current prices, 
US$million and as percent of total ODA 
 
A. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
                                                 
53
 . See Nissanke and Shimomura (2013) for more detailed discussions on comparative analysis of aid flows in 
the East Asia and SSA. 
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B. East Asia 
 
Source: OECD Data Set on Bilateral ODA Commitments by Purpose 
 
Fig. 14 A-B shows a breakdown of ODA allocated to each of three components (economic 
and social infrastructures and water supply), while Fig.15 A-B shows a breakdown of 
bilateral and multilateral aid by economic and social infrastructures. Both Fig. 14 and Fig.15 
drawn from the OECD-CRS system illustrate the trends of changes in distribution of 
infrastructure aid by categories in 2010 constant prices of US$ millions since 1995.
54
 These 
                                                 
54 The OECD-CRS data are available only since 1995. 
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four figures again confirm that both bilateral and multilateral aid to economic infrastructure 
declined proportionately, as aid increasingly directed more to spending on social 
infrastructures in SSA, whereas aid for economic infrastructures in general and bilateral aid 
in particular  has maintained well in East Asia.   
 
Fig. 14.  Bilateral ODA to Economic and Social Infrastructure Projects and Water 
Supply and Sanitations in 2010 constant prices 
 
A. Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
B. East Asia 
 
 
Sources: OECD- CRS Data set  
Note: CRS is the Creditor Reporting System used for compiling OECD data 
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Fig.15. Aid to social and economic infrastructure by multilateral and bilateral aid in 
2010 constant prices 
 
A. Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
B. East Asia 
 
 
Sources: OECD- CRS Data set  
 
Three reasons can be given for the sharp reduction in aid allocation to economic 
infrastructure in Africa for those two decades. The first is the perceived failure of many 
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donor- and government-funded infrastructure projects in the past, dubbed often as ‗white 
elephants‘. Some of these projects were manifestly ‗wrong‘ from the inception, as they were 
motivated almost exclusively by political considerations, rather than carefully justified in 
economic terms. The others failed because of inadequate provision for recurrent and 
maintenance costs, unrealistic pricing or prevalence of regulatory forbearance or gross 
mismanagement.  The second reason is the relentless drive for public divesture, privatization 
and deregulation across infrastructure sectors, including provisions of water, 
telecommunications, transport and power in the 1990s. The third reason is the powerful 
advocacy for shifting public spending towards social sectors such as health and education 
partly as result of the deliberations of the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995.
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It is only over the last decade or so, and after the newly emerged literature on Africa‘s 
‗growth tragedy‘ in the late 1990s identified the region‘s geographical disadvantages as one 
of the most binding growth constraints, that the need for massive infrastructure investment is 
officially recognized as critical for accelerating economic and productivity growth as well as 
for poverty reduction. This unfortunate delay in reinstating the critical importance of 
infrastructure investment for African development reflects largely the unhealthy situation 
evolved since the early 1980s, wherein the priority of the development agenda for Africa is 
predominantly set by the donor community, in particular by IFIs.
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  Thus, we suggest that the 
belated official recognition of Africa‘s disadvantages in infrastructure development has 
entailed a heavy cost in terms of forgone economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
Today, after such a costly neglect, the vital role of economic infrastructure for development is 
widely acknowledged as evident in the Commission Africa Report (2005). Given the 
enormous infrastructure deficits, in its call for an immediate doubling of ODA to Africa to 
$50 billion a year, the Commission for Africa reckoned about a half of ODA to be spent in 
infrastructure building. It is at this particular historical juncture that China, along many other 
emerging economies such as Brazil, India and Malaysia, has increased aid and investment in 
Africa, offering a new kind of development partnership, without any policy conditionality 
attached, on the basis of a ―coalition‖ engagement, i.e. a collaborative state-business 
approach through aid-trade-investment as a package. So far, one of main focuses of China‘s 
aid has been exactly on economic infrastructure building, which is now universally seen as 
critical for Africa‘s future.57  
 
As Chinese aid for infrastructure projects to Africa under the ―resources for infrastructure‖ 
format, known as the ―Angola mode‖, is provided in preferential loans, a fear has been raised 
over the debt sustainability arising out of Africa‘s new debt obligations to China and other 
non-DAC members. Some concerns are also expressed, almost  accusing China and other 
new lenders for essentially free-riding on the debt cancellation of US$43 billion granted to 
the HIPC countries through the MDRI  in 2005 (World Bank 2006). However, Reisen and 
Ndoye (2008) find very little evidence of “imprudent lending” to debt relief beneficiaries in 
the figures up to 2006 in their empirical analysis of debt dynamics for three country groups: 
                                                 
55   See Ndulu (2006) for this particular point..  
56 The diagnoses offered by the donor community for development failures in Africa has in fact evolved from the ―capital 
shortage‖ in the 1960s and 1970s, to the ―policy failures‖ in the 1980s, and finally to the ―institutional failures‖ in the 1990s 
(Adam and  O‘Conell, 1997). Only in the 2000s, the ‗infrastructure‘ failure in Africa has got due attention eventually. 
 
57 . See Nissanke and Soderberg (2010) and Nissanke and Shimomura (2013) for more detail discussions of China‘s 
engagement with Africa including such questions as: China‘s domestic imperatives for its drive in Africa; its adoption of the 
economic cooperation model practiced by Japanese government in Asia as China‘s chosen aid modality with some notable 
variations: and its impacts on African development, which have raised both hopes and fears in the region.  
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African HIPC, HIPC-China (High China Presence), and Resource-rich IDA-only. China has 
also been granting debt relief to African countries on its own loans rather readily so far.  
 
Indeed, these concerns may prove to be exaggerated or misplaced, if new lending from these 
emerging creditors could produce higher growth dividends, than from loans by traditional aid 
providers, by concentrating on investment in critical bottlenecks for development in Africa, 
such as in infrastructure and agriculture. Seen from this perspective, the IDA‘s non-
concessional borrowing policy (NCBP) adopted in 2006 to prevent excessive non-
concessional borrowing by grant-eligible countries may be seen to be anti-developmental.  
Though more flexibility has been introduced over recent years, the NCBP is used to threaten 
LICs with cuts in highly concessional financing from IDA and other concessional lending 
windows, if they borrow on non-concessional terms from commercial or new sovereign 
lenders, which is viewed as placing debt sustainability at risk. Certainly, this may be an 
example of how the DSF is applied too rigidly and mechanically to justify certain concerns 
by the IFIs and the traditional donor community without much due regard to possible 
dynamics that could emerge in the debt-investment-growth nexus in many LICs.  
 
Indeed, the surge in interests in resource rich Africa from China, India and other emerging 
creditors has also had other tangible spill-overs, unforeseen hitherto in Africa. For the first 
time, private investors have increasingly started taking Africa seriously as one of key 
destinations of their direct and portfolio investment. Accordingly, debt dynamics in Africa 
could change dramatically with these private capital flows. Their absorptive capacity of aid 
and debt carrying capacity may increase gradually with these investment activities as well. 
After all, whether a potential virtuous cycle of growth-cum-debt could be finally established 
in LICs would depend critically on productivity of investment made with new capital and 
economy-wide rates of social returns from investment.   
 
Therefore, appropriate, invaluable lessons can be drawn from historical experiences of LICS 
to understand under which conditions debt cannot be growth-enhancing, and what should be 
done to avoid the repeat of the low equilibrium of low growth with high debt. Key to this is 
the rate and efficiency of investment where loans are deployed. Therefore, a critical analysis 
of what debt is used for should be a part of debt sustainability analyses. Good appreciation of 
country-specific history in this regard is indeed valuable for inserting back ―investment‖ into 
analyses of debt sustainability.   
 
V. Policy Implications 
 
V.1. Applying the DSAs as a monitoring mechanism for prudent sovereign debt 
management 
 
Clearly, the DGE model introduced as a coherent macroeconomic framework to underpin 
calibration and stress tests has made substantial improvements to DSAs in critical technical 
aspects.  However, an increasing sophistication of the models and computation techniques 
applied to DSAs by itself does not substitute for efforts in engaging with the concept of debt 
sustainability at a deeper level.  From this perspective, we argue that the present DSF as an 
overarching framework requires substantial rethinking for its operational use as the definite 
tool for ensuring debt sustainability.  Much more care and caution should be exercised when 
the DSAs are used for lending/borrowing decisions as a prescriptive tool. This is particularly 
so in light of problems associated with the CPIA-determined debt burden thresholds. Instead, 
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the DSAs should be treated as an indicative guide for monitoring debt profiles and one of 
useful informational bases for prudent debt management.  The mechanical application of the 
DSAs is certainly harmful than useful.  
 
The IMF itself warns against a mechanical use of the DSA as a prescriptive tool, and 
emphasises the need for striking the balance between an outcome of the DSA and a 
judgemental approach based on country specific factors and circumstances in assessing the 
debt distress risk and making borrowing/lending decisions for a particular country. However, 
it also notes a number of advantages of the DSA on the basis of: self-regulating (automatic 
calibration to historical economic performance); operational ease (an ease of the application) 
for lending decisions such as the risk rating; provision of timely updated information; 
transparent and uniformity across countries and over time. 
 
Indeed, by claiming that ―DSAs provide an indication of the terms and volumes that a 
country should receive in order for its debt to remain sustainable (Barkbu et.al. 2008:16)‖, the 
IFIs overstate the utilitarian value of the DSF in relation to today‘s highly uncertain world. 
No economic forecasting exercises performed in advanced countries with a more 
sophisticated modelling and better and more reliable data available can claim to pass an 
accuracy test of small margins of error even for a shorter period of up to five years, let alone 
for a 20-year period made in the DSAs.
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  Any forecasting of debt burden indicators beyond a 
five year period or so is likely to lose a predictive power. Hence, much less weight should be 
attached to a predicted debt profile of a longer time horizon, even though forecasting over a 
20 year period is still performed because concessional loans given to LICs are characterised 
by a long maturity period of 40 years or so often with a grace period of 10 years as the case 
with the IDA loans. For this very reason, a frequent updating in the light of changing 
circumstances is necessary and if (and when) unanticipated events affecting a country‘s debt 
profile takes place, the DSAs should be revised in a timely manner. 
 
The uniformity of the analyses in the current DSF has certainly advantages for comparison 
across countries and over time. However, it also entails disadvantages in making the model 
less flexible for taking into account country specific features and circumstances. It should be 
noted that disadvantages often outweigh advantages when the DSAs are misused. The Non-
Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP) originally adopted with reference to the DSF may be 
regarded as one of such unfortunate applications. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged, as 
another round of policy review was undertaken to allow more flexibility for non-concessional 
borrowing from non-traditional sources (IMF, 2009).   
 
More generally, economic forecasting for debt sustainability inevitably involves the use of 
macroeconomic models, which require making various assumptions on variables included in 
the models. In this regard, Wyplosz (2007) reminds us that the usefulness of the DSAs is 
directly related to the validity of these assumptions, which by definition are neither safe nor 
testable and that any sustainability indicator will be both arbitrary and too imprecise to serve 
as a tool for policy prescription. Further, he reckons that the present methodological approach 
adopted in the DSAs is more likely to place a debt ceiling in attempting to define debt 
sustainability, which itself is ―elusive and mission impossible‖.   
                                                 
58 . In this context, one of the commentators in Sunday Times news paper of the UK reminds us, referring to the large 
forecasting errors over recent years found in the inflation Reports by the Bank of England cites, the following remarks made 
by John. K. Galbraith some time ago, when he was asked about the point of economic forecasting: ―the only function of 
economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable‖.   He adds that though forecasting is still necessary and useful 
for macroeconomic management, people expect economists to be humble (Sunday Times, 23 August 2010). 
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Rather than the danger of drawing too optimistic scenarios as the IMF fears, the present 
framework could lead to conservative lending/ borrowing decisions if its predictions are 
taken rigidly at face value. This is because it does not consider adequately different uses of 
concessional loans.  If the DSAs have an inherent tendency to produce systematically 
pessimistic projections of debt sustainability, the use of the DSAs for lending/borrowing 
decisions amounts to sacrificing economic growth and development on the basis of the 
imprecise nature of exercises, as concessional loans are meant for financing development in 
LICs. Certainly, we could not make sensible decisions affecting economic development only 
on the basis of a 25 % of probability of debt distress as the DSF implies presently.  
  
To facilitate development processes, governments of LICs can be by nature indebted to 
development finance institutions and partner governments that provide aid. Development 
agencies are in business of providing development finance in concessional loans and grants. 
At the same time, we should bear in mind that indebtedness on its own would not pose a 
danger, so long as sensible debt management and an appropriate facility to deal with 
adjustments to various shocks are in place. LICs are by their nature much more vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks. An application of more refined analytical tools for prediction of debt 
distresses by itself cannot guarantee that the debt profile of LICs remain within a zone free 
from distresses.  
 
Meanwhile, to remain current and truly ‗forward-looking‘, all DSAs should be regularly and 
timely updated in the light of fast changing conditions and new debt dynamics emerging with 
different types of investors, both private and official creditors, than those dominated by 
traditional donors so far in LICs. 
V.2. Innovative Contingent Facility - A Missing Facility in the DSF 
 
The IMF/IDA paper containing an original proposal of the DSF lists the following as 
characteristics of LICs that could exacerbate the debt service problems and adversely affect 
their ability to cope with high debt. These are: (i) risks of misuse and mismanagement of 
resources, due to weak public institutions, poor governance, and generally low 
implementation capacity; (ii) returns on investment that frequently accrue only over the long 
term, and whose benefits (such as, from improved security and healthcare) may be diffuse 
and cannot be easily captured by governments in the form of higher taxes to repay debts; and 
(iii) narrow and highly volatile production and export bases that make these countries 
particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks that can significantly worsen their debt dynamics 
(IMF/IDA (2004a:10). 
 
Thus, at least as a part of the last characteristic in the list, it recognises that one of the reasons 
why many LICs, mostly heavily dependent for revenues from exports of a few commodities, 
have a propensity to fall into a debt distress situation. Today, several decades after gaining 
political independence, the high primary commodity dependence remains one of the most 
conspicuous characteristics of the trade linkage of countries in many LICs with the rest of the 
world under globalisation. Further, the high commodity export dependence has a very 
specific regional dimension - a particular feature of many LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. Fig 
16 shows that among developing countries, Africa, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), and 
Middle East and North Africa (MINA) have much higher dependence ratio, compared to 
South Asia, East Asia and Europe and Central Asia. 
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Fig.16. Share of Primary Commodities in Merchandise Exports of Developing Countries 
by Regions 
 
 
Source: Brahmbhatt andCanuto (2010)  
 
Economic cycles of commodity dependent LICs have been historically dominated by price 
movements of their major primary export commodities. The large scale of price movements 
observed in short-run fluctuations as well as over medium-term cycles has naturally had serious 
policy implications for managing their economies. The hypersensitivity to externally originated 
instability is one of the critical weaknesses of commodity dependent economies. An eventual 
transformation into more diversified economic structures is the real solution to the problems 
associated with the ‗commodity dependence trap‘.  For the transition/intervening period, 
however, skilful economic management over the commodity price cycles, which can reduce the 
amplitude of oscillations in market forces, are indispensable for productive investment that 
could facilitate the process of structural transformation.  
 
Yet, the demand management of these economies is very complex, since an externally-induced 
balance of payments crisis, by its own force, leads to a sharp drop in domestic demand. The 
orthodox stabilisation policies adopted primarily to restore external equilibrium in such 
circumstances can move the economy further away from internal equilibrium, at least in the 
short-run. In the light of domestic aggregate demand, these policies can well be pro-cyclical to 
the direction of both internal and external market forces rather than counter-cyclical as they 
should be as noted in our earlier paper (Nissanke 1993, 2010 b&c). For commodity dependent 
economies, macroeconomic management is judged as counter-cyclical, when an appropriate 
policy configuration of fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and financial policies would allow 
softening the effects of commodity price shocks on both the external and the internal balances 
simultaneously.  
Today, after experiencing the up-swing phase in the commodity price super-cycle for nearly 
10 years since 2002, it is understandable that an attention of the policy makers of commodity 
dependent LICs is now directed towards the question as to how to make best use of resource 
rents for economic development. However, there is also a possibility that commodity prices 
may experience another sharp down turn in not a distant future, if the world economy 
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descends into a recession again as the recovery from the global financial crisis is at best 
fragile, and a threat of double-recession of the global economy is never far away, as many 
emerging economies which have been behind the recent commodity boom, started 
experiencing a notable slowdown amidst the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and other parts 
of the world. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the recent sharp commodity price 
increase of basic commodities has produced deficits of considerable size and hardships to 
LICs dependent on imports of foods, fuels and other essential commodities in their balance-of 
payments and fiscal balances.    
 
Counter-cyclical macroeconomic management through commodity stabilisation funds as 
practised in countries such as in Chile and Norway at the national level is usually presented  
as an effective solution to oil and mineral resource rich economies.
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 Although counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policy at the national level is critical, many LICs find the 
opportunity cost of holding savings abroad high in the light of immediate pressing needs to 
accelerate economic development and to reduce debilitating poverty. Borensztein, Jeanne and 
Sadri (2009) argue that macro-hedging with derivative instruments could be viewed as an 
effective substitute for the counter-cyclical management through commodity stabilisation 
funds. However, this policy option is impractical and often too costly for LICs.
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Therefore, there is a strong case to be made for a more effective facility for LICs at the global 
level. In the post-war period, we have seen a number of compensatory facilities established to 
offset shortfalls in commodity export earnings such as the Compensatory and Contingency 
Finance Facility (CCFF) by IMF and the STABEX by EC (Maizels 1994, Hewitt, 1993 and 
2010). However, those operated in the past are not well designed and inappropriately 
structured to meet effectively the need facing the LICs. The original IMF Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) was established in 1963 as a low-conditionality semi-automatic 
mechanism for temporary balance-of-payments support but unfortunately available on a non-
concessional basis. The CCFF – a non-concessional facility established in 1988 to replace 
CCF- has become so highly conditional upon accepting pro-cyclical demand management 
that very few countries have turned to it for assistance since its inception. The Exogenous 
Shock Facility - a concessional loan facility for countries under the IMF‘s Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Programme established in 2000 - has continued to carry high policy 
conditionality to make it less popular and accessible to LICs than otherwise.   
 
Similarly, the STABEX has met rather limited success because of its pro-cyclical 
disbursements due to the long time lags from income shocks for delivery of compensation. 
Further, since the compensation under the STABEX was delivered in the form of grants only 
to agricultural sectors affected by income shocks, it has been argued that there was a 
diversion from other forms of ODA and the STABEX tends to discourage diversification 
efforts.
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 FLEX, which replaced STABEX and SYSMIN under the Cotonou Agreement of 
2000, has been under criticism for slowness of disbursements and resource constraints so far. 
 
Yet, notably, the DSF is silent on the question of enacting a contingent facility altogether.  In 
fact, one of the fundamental weaknesses of the DSF is that while recognising LICs‘ 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks as one of main factors behind their high propensity to fall 
into a debt distress situation, the DSF discusses LICs‘ vulnerability to exogenous shocks as 
                                                 
59  See Nissanke (2010d). 
60  See Nissanke and Keleshov for more detailed discussions on difficulties and impracticality of using derivatives 
instruments for macro-hedging and risk management by commodity producers. 
61 Compensation for mineral products was administered under a separate facility- SYSMIN.  
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an issue only marginally through one of stress tests as part of routine DSA exercises. As 
noted in Section II.4 above, structural handicaps characterising LICs, which can be measured 
by the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and the Human Asst Index (HAI) are not taking 
into account in calculating the likelihood of debt distress. Further, when stress tests 
conducted reveal a possible bleach of at least one of the CPIA-determined debt burden 
thresholds, countries are classified as at medium risk ( if more bleached, they are considered 
at  high risk, and accordingly discouraged to take loans or sanctioned against taking non-
concessional loans through the Non Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP).  
 
Interestingly,  Buffee et.al (2012) note in passing how accessing to a concessional loan 
facility would alleviate a debt distress situation arising out of financing for productive 
investment surge but facing external shocks such as TOT shocks down the road. However 
they stay out of discussing how to make such an access to concessional windows possible in 
the face of shocks. Indeed, the DSF systematically avoids addressing the critical question of 
debt distress management altogether, in particular, how to deal effectively with downside 
risks facing LICs subject to frequent exogenous shocks.  In this context, we suggest that 
insofar as vulnerability to shocks represents a key determinant of debt distress, any debt 
sustainability framework that does not effectively translate vulnerability assessments into 
appropriate policy responses in terms of volume and timing of aid and debt relief is bound to 
fail in providing a lasting solution to debt distress of low-income countries. In a way, it is 
hard to interpret the failure for the DSF in this critical aspect as a simple technical omission. 
Under the current practice, the DSF can create a false sense of security as if they are free 
from debt distress altogether, so long as LICs adhere to the recommendation resulting from 
the DSA exercises.  
 
We suggest that the protracted debt crisis in HIPCs is associated with the absence of an 
effective and flexible facility of contingency financing to deal with external shocks facing 
HIPCs on an ex-ante basis. Throughout 1980s and 1990,  official creditors have instead kept 
applying ex-post debt relief mechanisms with policy conditionality attached in response to 
recurrent liquidity crises and the ensued ‗debt overhang‘ condition. Given this history behind, 
there is an urgent need to establish a global counter-cyclical contingent financial facility for 
low-income commodity dependent countries that ensures fast disbursement of aid and debt 
payment relief with low policy-conditionality and high concessionary elements upon negative 
commodity price shocks or any other exogenous shocks. 
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For the purpose in hand, it is best to structure aid and debt contracts ex ante for LICs facing 
frequent exogenous shocks such as commodity prices shocks or any other shocks with an 
automatic debt relief mechanism incorporated already in original contracts. A strong rationale 
for such flexible contingent debt contracts comes from the fact that debt can be made 
sustainable in principle, so long as illiquidity facing debtors are attended efficiently and 
timely. There are several proposals on table, which can be considered with a view to 
designing efficient, flexible debt contracts with a contingent close incorporated ex ante. For 
example, Cohen et al. (2005) and Cohen et.al (2008) presents arguments similar to those put 
forward in Section II.4 above, suggesting that subsidized contingent loans are superior to 
                                                 
62 . Even if the international community succeeds in reducing excessiveness in volatility in commodity prices by establishing 
new innovative stabilisation schemes such as those discussed in Nissanke (2010d, 2012), commodity prices would remain 
volatile due to very characteristics intrinsic to many primary commodities. As reported in Borensztein et.al (2009), shocks to 
commodity prices are very persistent. The year-to-year volatility in the price varies from 10-40 percent across primary 
commodities.   
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outright grants in financing productive investment in countries facing high vulnerability to 
external shocks such as natural resource price volatility. They show that debt and debt 
cancellations are two complementary instruments which, if properly managed, perform better 
than either standard loans or grants taken in isolation.  
 
Taking these arguments further, Cohen et al. (2008) propose a new contingent facility: the 
Countercyclical loan (CCL). The CCL facility is assigned to transform the grace period of a 
typical concessional loan into a fixed initial grace period and a floating grace period, which 
the country can draw upon when a negative shock occurs. More concretely, they propose to 
reduce the grace period of a typical concessional loan, from ten to five years, and to keep the 
remaining grace periods as an asset that the country can draw upon, when a negative shock 
takes place.
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 This is a very concrete proposal deserving serious consideration. 
 
Our proposal entails a contingency facility in which contingency is indexed to a verifiable 
state of nature rather than to debtor‘s capacity to pay such as GDP growth to eschew the 
potential ‗incentive‘ problem. This is because outcome indicators such as GDP growth rates 
reflect the results originating from exogenous shocks/events outside of control of borrowers 
as well as efforts/inputs on the part of borrows to honour debt obligations to their best ability, 
as discussed in Section II.2 above. Thus, we argue specifically for establishing genuinely 
flexible, state-contingent debt relief mechanisms in order to avoid a recurrence of debt crises. 
In environments dominated by high uncertainty, any inter-temporal financial contracts have 
to work out with difficulties in dealing with high risks of non-payments. In order to find an 
efficient solution from this kind of problems, it is instrumental to classify risks into two 
categories: i)  idiosyncratic risks of non-payment originating from borrowers‘ ability and 
willingness; and ii) systemic risks stemming from external events which are not under control 
of a borrower/ a lender. Unlike equity contracts in which both parties share systemic risks, 
standard debt contracts usually obligate borrowers to make regular payments irrespective of 
what happens during these contractual periods. This means that in debt contracts systemic 
risks are usually assumed by borrowers. In an event, when a ‗good‘ state prevails, a borrower 
would take all returns net of his/her payments obligation. However, if a ‗bad‘ state happens to 
prevail, a borrower faces an illiquidity problem, i.e. difficulties in making regular payments 
even such a state is not under her/his control.  
 
The ‗state-contingent‘ schemes are designed to deal with such a problem stemming from 
illiquidity. Following the convention used in Burlow and Rogoff (1981), the literature on 
sovereign debt emphasises the existence of perverse incentives in sovereign debt contracts 
arising from the difficulty in making a distinction between ability and willingness to pay. 
Instead, the ‗state-contingent‘ contracts are to address the resulting moral hazard issue by 
distinguishing between the consequences of a borrower‘s own efforts and events beyond 
her/his control. The state-contingent contract would specify their contractual obligations 
contingent on the ‗nature of states‘, and hence deal explicitly and effectively with uncertainty 
associated with exogenous shocks and systemic risks. As Krugman (1988) notes, the trade-off 
between debt forgiveness and financing in a typical negotiation can be improved by indexing 
repayment to the ‗state of nature‘, which can be verifiable.  
 
Based on his analysis, we argue for drawing incentive-compatible, state-contingent debt 
contracts which would allow sovereign debtors automatic access to contingency financing 
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 . The negative shock in their proposal is defined as an export shock, whereby current exports fall below a 
moving average of the past five years. 
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when recipient countries are hit by adverse unforeseen events. Both the CCL and the state-
contingent debt contracts involve an introduction of flexibility into standard debt contracts by 
adjusting the grace periods or subsidized interest rates slightly.  Such a facility would 
facilitate adjustment processes required to deal with shocks and reduce the associated costs of 
adjustment, as depicted in Fig 4 in Section III.2 above. A genuinely flexible, state-contingent 
aid and debt contract is efficient by making protracted, time-consuming negotiations typical 
to ex-post debt restructuring unnecessary as well as by better aligning incentives of borrowers 
and lenders. By addressing the moral hazard problem directly, this can create incentives for 
sovereign borrowers to make efforts for attaining better performance than the current CPIA-
centred performance based aid allocation and Debt Sustainability Framework. The presence 
of such an incentive compatible contingency facility can make policy makers more 
accountable to domestic stakeholders for their decisions on policies and subsequent courses 
of action, since the outcome of their efforts are made transparent by netting out external 
shocks and events.   
 
Some technical details should be worked out how to identify a trigger point for such a facility 
and how to make debt payment schedule restructured upon an event of ‗verifiable‘ exogenous 
shocks. However, technical issues associated with creating an ‗efficient‘ contingent facility 
can be overcome if a strong political commitment to such a facility exists. Indeed, the 
original DSF proposal (IMF/ID, 2004a) mentions in passing the need to supplement the DSF 
with a contingent debt service facility, stating that ―since an appropriate mix of concessional 
loans and grants would provide only limited capacity to absorb large, unforeseen, exogenous 
shocks, creditors may also wish to consider new or modified concessional lending 
instruments to deal with such eventualities‖. 
 
The importance of instituting a pre-qualified automatic line of assistance at times of crises is 
also emphasized by Kanbur (2010), who calls for designing a flexible, comprehensive system 
of social protection for the poor as a response to global crises. In fact, there are several recent 
examples which point to more willingness, on the part of the IFIs and the donor community 
at large, to consider some facilities for dealing with large exogenous shocks. For example, in 
the wake of the devastating impacts from the recent global financial and economic crisis of 
2008-9, the IMF's special SDR allocation in its emergency response, has greatly contributed 
to mitigating the decrease in foreign reserves in Low-Income Countries. For example, it 
increased its commitments to Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) eligible countries 
from an average of SDR1.5bn in 2007 and 2008, to SDR7.9bn in 2009 and SDR4.9bn in 
2010. At the same time, the IMF has streamlined its financial facilities to LICs and instituted  
three new windows of credit lines – Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Standby Credit Facility 
(SCF) and Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) with the first replacing the PRGF and  the latter two - 
the Exogenous Shock Facility as well as the Post Conflict and Natural Disaster Facilities. 
There is some relaxation of the overall IMF conditionality, especially as regards the structural 
policies, while access to IMF credit lines as a proportion of quotas was doubled for LICs in 
April 2009, though it still remains very much lower than that available for MICs. 
   
Similarly, the IDA has responded by establishing a one-off Crisis Response Window (CRW) 
- a window operating ex post - for the countries facing acute shocks. An automatic debt 
moratorium or relief has also a number of precedence. The donor community has in the past 
responded quickly to the urgent needs of countries hit by natural disasters such as flooding, 
tsunami or earthquakes, by not only providing emergency humanitarian aid but also making 
an option of debt moratorium or substantial debt relief measures available immediately.  
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However, most of these facilities are available only as ex-post responses to ‗unexpected‘ 
events.  Further, the new IMF‘s facility, SCF, is designed to deal with both external and 
domestic policy shocks, which makes it easier to justify high (upper credit tranche) policy 
conditionality even in the face of external shocks. Except the very small RCF, which only 
reaches 25% of a country‘s quota per annum, all these facilities are really not an automatic 
credit line with low conditionality in dealing with external shocks, which was the case with 
the IMF‘s original Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) established in 1963. The latter, 
available to MICs on non-concessionary basis, was so widely and successfully used by these 
countries in the previous decades but abolished and replaced by the CCFF with very high 
policy conditionality in 1988.  
 
There is a very strong case for reinstating a truly automatic non-conditional credit line at the 
IMF, which is accessible upon encountering exogenous shocks by both MICS and LICs.  We 
cannot help but conclude that the donor community has so far failed to show sufficient 
interest in devising an effective ex ante response system for protecting vulnerable countries 
against the negative impacts from other external economic shocks such as commodity price 
shocks on economic growth and debt sustainability.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that a contingent credit line provided on a temporary basis 
may prove to be not sufficient to make debt truly sustainable in the long-run for LICs when 
they face shocks of large proportions and of more permanent nature, such as the case with the 
continuously deteriorating terms of trade faced by commodity dependent countries in the 
1980s and 1990s as shown in Figure 17. Should does such a condition arise in future, an 
automatic access to a contingent financing would create a time and space necessary for an 
orderly restructuring of sovereign debt and a negotiation for further development finance 
assistance. Using a typology of shocks and desired international responses, Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo (2009) also argue that when shocks proves to be permanent as opposed to the case of 
temporary shocks, official liquidity provision through a contingent facility should be 
supplemented by continuous flows of development finance and grants. This is to prevent 
disruption of LICs‘ efforts in advancing the process of economic development in the face of 
such economic shocks, as in the cases of when LICs are hit by catastrophic natural disasters.  
 
Fig. 17.  Real Non-Fuel Commodity Prices: 1900-2015 
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Source: Brahmbhatt and Canuto (2010)  
 
 
V.3. Enhancing the Role of the AFDB as a Premier development finance institution for 
Regional Member Countries 
 
In the previous sub-section, we have made a strong case for establishing a new innovative 
contingent facility embedded ex ante in sovereign debt contracts to deal with exogenous 
shocks as part of a programme to make debt sustainable for LICs. The two concrete proposals 
outlined above are a facility with a pre-qualified automatic line of assistance at times of debt 
distress by introducing a flexibility of adjustments to either the grace periods or subsidised 
interest rates into contracts. Giving assurance that liquidity is made available immediately 
upon shocks through such a contingent facility can create incentives for sovereign borrowers 
to make efforts for attaining better performance than the current CPIA-centred performance 
based aid allocation and DSF.  It would also provide a space and time for more orderly 
sovereign debt restructuring without having pressures from immediate liquidity crises, even if 
shocks are not temporary, and of rather prolonged nature.   Sovereign borrowers are then 
encouraged to focus on achieving development objectives.  Indeed, such a contingent debt 
contract can in principle incorporate a clause of accelerating repayment schedules at times of 
positive shocks such as commodity booms. 
 
As a premier development finance institution, the African Development Bank should 
consider taking an initiative of pioneering an effective contingent facility into its own 
concessional loan contracts offered to RMCs. The facility itself can self-finance such a 
scheme at least partially through making some adjustments to the grace periods or raising 
marginally subsidised interest rates of the standard loan contracts issued under the African 
Development Fund (AfDF). In fact, more generally, the terms of loan contracts currently 
offered under the AfDF may be too standardised to fit the purpose, i.e. different uses of loan 
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facilities. The AfDF provides financial assistance in the form of grants and regular loans to 
member LICs with the grant-loan mix determined according to the traffic light system of the 
DSF as practiced in the IDA allocation. As discussed in detail in Section II above, in our 
view, the decisions to use grants or loans should be made in light of what they are used for. 
For the same token, lending terms of loans should be more finely differentiated depending on 
their application.  
 
Presently, lending terms of regular loans of the AfDF are a 50-year maturity with a 10-year 
grace period with no interest payments attached, and only 0.75 % of service charges and 
0.50 % of commitment charges are applicable.  The repayment schedule is 1 % for 11-20 
years and 3% for 21-50 years. This makes estimated concessionality calculated with 6 % 
discount rate at 66% - one of the most generous loan terms available among all development 
financing facilities- more generous than those available under the regular IDA credit with its 
estimated concessionality at 61 %.  The AfDF offers loan contracts a 30-year maturity and a 
8-year grace period to blend/gap countries with interest rates of 1 % and the same service and 
commitment charges as in the regular loans to LICs. The payment schedule under this facility 
is 3% for 9-19 years and 6.1 % for 20-30 years with an estimated concessionality of 41 %.    
 
The lending terms currently offered to LICs under the AfDF are more favoulable compared 
with those offered by other MDBs and RDBs such as Asian Development Bank or Inter- 
American Bank.  For example, lending terms of project loans provided currently under the 
Asian Development Fund or those of general loans offered by IADB carry estimated 
elements of concessionality of 41-7 % calculated at 6% of discount rates.   
 
Reflecting improved debt carrying capacities of RMCs, there is a proposal to sub-divide 
regular loans into regular and advanced regular loans with a shorter grace/maturity period of 
10/40 years and 5/40 years and some adjustments to repayment schedule respectively. These 
loan facilities are estimated to carry still high concessionality of 61 % and 51 % in place of 
66 % presently available under regular loans. The terms of loans to blend/gap countries are 
also envisaged to change into ones with a shorter grace/maturity of 5/30 years with annual 
equal repayment schedule, which makes estimated concessionality drop from 41 % to 35 %.  
These new terms are still very generous for financing productive investment, so long as 
investment are well selected and managed and could generate high economy-wide social 
returns with high development dividend.  
 
Naturally, the lending terms available through concessional windows of MDBs and RDBs are 
far less expensive and much more financially attractive than those available from commercial 
sources, including terms attached to sovereign bond issues as well as those offered by 
emerging partners through South-South Cooperation, as discussed in Section IV.1 above. In 
fact, comparison across the loan facilities currently available for financing productive 
investment reveals a huge difference in lending terms between concessional loan facilities 
offered by the traditional aid community and those available from commercial lenders. The 
gap is so large to have given rise to a very marked ―missing middle‖ in the spectrum of 
financial products available only in the ―bipolar categories‖, either in highly concessional 
instruments or very expensive commercial ones.
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 Lending terms offered by emerging 
                                                 
64 . See Martin (2013) for his remarks on this point. According to the estimates reported by him, the cost of different 
financial sources as net of amounts provided is vastly different: Grants-0%; official concessional loans – less than 10 %; 
official blend loans – over 20 %; official non-concessional – over 50 %, bonds – over 60 %; bank loans – over 70 %; 
domestic debt – 100 %; and PPP facilities – nearly 150 %. Though the methods applied to arrive at these figures are not clear, 
these estimates illustrate how vast the cost varies across different financing mechanisms.   
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partners such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey for infrastructure and other productive 
investment appear exactly to play a vital role of filling this critical ―missing middle‖  by 
offering financial instruments that are between official highly concessional loans available to 
LICs on the one hand, and official non-concessional, hard credits on the other. This may well 
explain the popularity of taking up loans from these emerging partners, in addition to much 
quicker disbursement and no ‗policy‘ conditionality attached.  
 
Evaluated from this perspective, though the rational given is understandable, the non-
concessional borrowing policy (NCBP) enacted by the IFIs and other MDBs, including by the 
African Development Bank, in fear of ―free-riding‖ on the part of non-traditional sovereign 
lenders and uncontrolled debt accumulation developing since 2006 may be somewhat 
misplaced. Naturally, monitoring of debt levels is always a part of prudent sovereign debt 
management, and this should apply to all kinds of non-concessional borrowing. However, the 
crux of the matter here is again more to do with questions such as whether these lending 
terms of non-concessional borrowings from emerging partners are carefully considered and 
negotiated in interests of RMCs, in prior to taking up, in their appropriateness for financing 
the project in question and whether investment thus financed would produce high growth and 
development dividends on time to honor repayment schedule.  
 
In fact, the NCBP has been gradually relaxed since 2009 and been now applied on a case-by- 
case basis. The African Development Bank has introduced more flexibility in this regard in 
2011. The IMF has become particularly more lenient towards LICs‘ accessing to debt 
instruments available on commercial terms. However, financial instruments on commercial 
terms comes with a much shorter maturity and higher interest rates and commission charges, 
entailing often  higher risk of threatening debt sustainability than under other debt 
instruments, as discussed in detail in Section IV.1 above. 
 
Given this, what may be more helpful in this regard is for MDBs such as the AfDF to 
introduce more flexibility in their debt contracts, and provide a variety of financial 
instruments and products with a varied degree of concessionality, probably more 
differentiated and individually tailor-made and packaged for different usages in terms of 
appropriate grace/maturity periods, interest rates and repayment schedule etc. in a country-
specific context.
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However, one of real constrains that the African Development Bank faces for playing a 
leading role in provision of concessional development finance is its currently very limited 
size of the overall funding resource envelope for the AfDF, as it is mainly sourced from grant 
contribution by partner countries. It is reported that the AfDF approved average UA 590 
million loans for infrastructure projects in 2010-12. Providing loans in differentiated products, 
in particular, shortening the grace/maturity periods, accelerating the amortization period, or 
charging slightly higher subsidized interest rates in some portions of the AfDF‘s debt 
contracts would eventually enhance the AfDF‘s resource base by increasing reflows from 
repayment of principals on outstanding credits. However, it will take some time for reflows in 
this way to contribute measurable to its funding sources from the current low base. Therefore, 
as part of its own resource mobilization, the African Development Bank may also consider 
                                                 
65 . It may be noted here that the terms of concessional loans offered to East Asian countries for infrastructure and productive 
investments by Japan‘s OECF and JBIC in the early periods were very flexible. Highly differentiated and tailor made to 
specific projects. Apart from the flexibility of loan contracts, their efforts were concentrated on local institution development, 
which were very successful sustaining in good infrastructure service provisions. See Nissanke and Shimomura (2013) for 
more detailed discussions and East Asian case studies of infrastructure development.    
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making resource transfers between its Fund and Bank facilities easier, whenever this is 
appropriate. This may be achieved partly by allowing an increasing number of RMCs in 
transition to graduation on different sets of blend terms that can be jointly financed by the 
Fund and Bank.  It would lead the AfDF indirectly accessing to international capital markets 
on the terms available to the Bank operation, which currently enjoy the AAA rating.  
 
Given the currently prevailing, historically low interest rate environments, there may be a 
temptation for the AfDF to go for raising funds directly from international capital market on a 
very limited scale on behalf of some RMCs, if prudential risk assessment would point to this 
possibility. However, in order to preserve the high credit standing, the Fund needs to 
establish first a good track record in its own operations and balance sheets. For this to 
materialize, it may be necessary and desirable to have the Fund‘s assets portfolio somewhat 
away from the current domination of highly concessional loans in its balance sheet.  Hence, it 
may be some time in future before the Fund feels confident to go for debt financing of its 
operation, even on a limited scale. Instead, for the purpose of increasing its resource envelope, 
the Fund may opt for additional contribution from partner countries in concessional loans 
rather than relying solely on their grant contribution for its lending operation.  
   
Meanwhile,  the African Development Bank could back up large-scale transformational 
projects requiring private or other funding by providing partial credit guarantees based on its 
accumulated, solid country-specific knowledge and high quality technical assistance. This 
would allow RMCs leverage in additional funding from private sources on more favourable 
terms than otherwise possible.  Encouraging co-financing projects with concessional loans 
from partner countries or other MDBs such as IDA would also allow many big investment 
projects to go ahead, which may prove to be impossible otherwise.  It is also helpful to 
consider and encourage, wherever it is appropriate, a mixed financing mode combining 
concessional loans and equity participation from private sources through the PPP schemes, 
tailor-made for individual investment projects. 
 
As final concluding remarks, we again highlight the importance to draw appropriate, 
invaluable lessons from the historical experiences of LICS to understand under which 
conditions debt cannot be growth-enhancing, and what should be done to avoid the repeat of 
the protracted debt crisis that had trapped many LICs in a low equilibrium of low growth with 
high debt. Key to preventing this is, first of all, the rate and efficiency of investment where 
loans are deployed. Therefore, a critical analysis of what and how debt is used for should be a 
part of debt sustainability analyses.  Debt contracted by LICs can be made sustainable if 
concessional loans are effectively and responsibly deployed for efficient investment in 
projects with high social returns with a view to overcoming structural handicaps these 
countries currently suffer. Good appreciation of country-specific history in this regard is 
indeed necessary for inserting back ―investment‖ as the critical link into analyses of the debt-
growth nexus.   
 
Second, it is important to design more efficient debt contracts so as to align better the 
incentives for sovereign borrowers and lenders as development partners. This would enable 
borrowers and lenders to forge a true partnership for engaging in the development process of 
LICs while strengthening sovereign borrowers‘ debt carrying capacity. Taking a long term 
view of economic development process, we should endeavor to create a forum for debt 
sustainability through participatory sovereign debt management as a way forward for making 
debt truly sustainable. It is up to responsible lenders and borrowers to make sure that 
concessional loans and debt instruments are used to facilitate actively the process of 
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transformation of their economic structures, while consolidating their debt servicing capacity 
over time.  In this endeavour, the African Development Bank can assume a leading role by 
providing local institutions with technical assistance and expertise in project management 
from selection through planning to implementation as well as in structuring appropriate 
financial instruments, including debt contracts. The DSAs should be used in this process as 
one of monitoring devices, not the dominant prescriptive tool.   
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Appendix 1 Additional Figures and Tables  
Figure A-1  Simulations of Debt-Burden Indicators under Alternative Scenarios, 2003-
2023 under the DSA 
 
 
Source: Figure 4 in IMF (2004a) 
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Fig. A-2 Fan Charts for Uruguay Using Different Forecasting Methods 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fig. 6 Arizala et.al (2008) 
 
Fig.A-3 Terms of Public Debt and Private Debt offered to Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
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Table A-1. Summary Table of External Debts of countries in Africa  2009-2011 
 
 
  Total 
external 
debt, 2011 
($ millions) 
Present 
value of 
debt, 2011 
($ millions) 
Ratio of 
total 
external 
debt to 
exports 
(%), 
2006 
Ratio of 
total 
external 
debt to 
exports 
(%), 
2009-
2011 
Ratio of 
present 
value of 
debt to 
exports 
(%) 
Ratio of 
total 
external 
debt to 
GNI (%) 
Ratio of 
present 
value of 
debt to 
GNI (%) 
Ratio of 
debt 
service 
to 
exports, 
2006 
Ratio of 
debt 
service 
to 
exports, 
2011 
  
North Africa 
           
Upper middle income  Algeria 6,072 3,737 9.8 9 6 4 2 22.5 0.8   
  Tunisia 22,335 19,215 114.9 99 85 53 45 15.6 10.7   
Lower middle income Djibouti 767 491 165.7 173 110 63 40 7.7 8.1 1) 
  Egypt, Arab Rep. 35,001 27,719 78.1 74 58 17 13 6.2 7.4   
  Morocco 29,049 23,443 89.0 102 82 32 26 16.9 9.9   
Sub-Saharan Africa                       
Upper middle income  Angola 21,115 17,705 29.5 39 33 27 23 13.2 4.2   
  Botswana 2,396 1,553 6.7 74 48 16 11 1.0 1.4 1) 
  Gabon 2,879 2,398 -- 35 29 24 20 -- --   
  Mauritius 1,435 961 15.3 16 11 14 10 5.9 1.4   
  Namibia                     
  Seychelles 1,779 1,636 127.6 170 157 201 185 20.6 3.2   
  South Africa 113,512 60,121 66.6 110 58 33 17 8.6 5.3   
Lower middle income Cameroon 3,074 1,638 69.9 51 27 13 7 10.1 3.5 1) 
  Cape Verde 1,025 555 106.7 151 82 62 33 6.4 5.0   
  Congo, Rep. 2,523 1,830 105.3 25 18 28 20 1.4 -- 2) 
  Cote d'Ivoire 12,012 12,374 134.8 96 98 54 55 2.8 4.7 1) 
  Ghana 11,289 8,050 71.2 106 76 35 25 5.6 2.4   
  Lesotho 792 452 44.4 53 30 30 17 3.1 1.9 1) 
  Nigeria 13,108 7,767 13.0 17 10 7 4 11.2 0.4   
  Sao Tome and 
Principe 
231 80 1568.5 885 306 106 37 31.5 5.4   
  Senegal 4,320 3,344 77.0 131 101 33 25 7.4 -- 2) 
  Sudan 21,169 23,857 309.7 193 218 37 42 5.1 4.2 1) 
  Swaziland 605 510 20.4 28 23 18 15 1.7 1.9   
  Zambia 4,360 1,637 56.7 61 23 30 11 3.5 2.1   
    Total Present Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of   
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external 
debt, 2011 
($ millions) 
value of 
debt, 2011 
($ millions) 
total 
external 
debt to 
exports 
(%), 
2006 
total 
external 
debt to 
exports 
(%), 
2009-
2011 
present 
value of 
debt to 
exports 
(%) 
total 
external 
debt to 
GNI (%) 
present 
value of 
debt to 
GNI (%) 
debt 
service 
to 
exports, 
2006 
debt 
service 
to 
exports, 
2011 
Low income Benin 1,423 960 66.3 95 64 21 14 4.2 2.5 1) 
  Burkina Faso 2,420 1,736 155.4 231 166 27 19 6.1 2.5 1) 
  Burundi 628 306 1404.0 346 169 30 15 19.6 3.4   
  Central African 
Republic 
573 221 -- 251 97 28 11 -- --   
  Chad 1,821 2,219 -- 46 56 24 29 -- --   
  Comoros 278 189 448.4 322 219 50 34 5.9 -- 2) 
  Congo, Dem. Rep. 5,448 4,530 359.9 67 56 44 37 9.2 2.4   
  Eritrea 1,055 600 -- 565 321 49 28 -- --   
  Ethiopia 8,597 4,445 101.8 185 96 28 14 6.2 6.1   
  Gambia, The 466 242 349.3 155 81 46 24 14.8 7.5   
  Guinea 3,139 1,932 284.9 223 137 74 45 13.6 11.2   
  Guinea-Bissau 284 132 1345.2 163 76 32 15 12.6 -- 2) 
  Kenya 10,258 7,052 110.5 114 79 32 22 7.1 4.2   
  Liberia 448 122 822.8 83 23 52 14 0.4 1.4 1) 
  Madagascar 2,769 1,771 89.5 148 95 31 20 3.6 2.1   
  Malawi 1,202 751 109.1 86 54 24 15 8.9 1.3   
  Mali 2,931 1,793 83.6 118 72 32 19 4.4 2.5 1) 
  Mauritania 2,709 2,479 103.8 115 105 78 71 5.8 3.6   
  Mozambique 4,097 2,240 95.4 127 69 39 21 1.6 1.6   
  Niger 1,408 1,630 127.3 113 131 26 30 26.7 -- 2) 
  Rwanda 1,103 790 143.3 170 122 19 14 8.8 2.4 1) 
  Sierra Leone 1,049 369 476.5 232 82 53 19 7.8 3.8   
  Somalia 3,050 3,469 -- .. .. .. .. -- --   
  Tanzania 10,044 6,062 116.2 155 93 45 27 2.5 2.0   
  Togo 643 507 204.2 51 40 20 15 3.1 -- 2) 
  Uganda 3,858 1,930 71.5 106 53 24 12 5.6 1.7   
  Zimbabwe 6,275 5,158 -- 187 153 83 68 -- --   
Sources: World Bank, International Debt Statistics, 2013. 1) Data for the ratio of debt service to exports under 2011 is for 2010. 2) No data available for the ratio of debt service to 
exports for 2011 or 2010 
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Appendix 2 Technical notes on the formulae used to generate debt 
dynamics in the DSA 
 
For generating external debt dynamics, DSA uses the following formulae(Barkbu et.al. 
2008): 
 
Dt = (1+it) Dt-1 + TDt - TRt -FDIt + ∆Rt                                                                                            (1) 
 
where Dt = nominal debt stock at the end of the period t, 
it = average effective interest rate in period t (= interest payments in period 
t divided by the debt stock in the previous period); 
TDt = deficit in the trade and services account; 
TRi = sum of official grants and current transfers; 
FDIt = Net non-debt-creating capital inflows; and 
∆Rt 
= Change in official reserves and other foreign assets. 
 
Since debt is provided in concessional terms and grant elements (GEt ) is defined as 
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Now, substituting for  Dt . and further introduce Xt   and ɛt for the dollar value of exports in 
period t  and the growth rate of exports respectively, then the Equation (1) can be expressed 
as: 
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 Now, assuming the grant element remains unchanged (GEt= GEt -1 ) and  ɛt
2  
 is very small, 
close to zero if ɛt « 1, then we obtain the following equation, which expresses a debt burden 
as a ratio of the present value of debt stock  to exports                                                                      
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For generating public debt dynamics, DSA uses the following formulae: 
 
Bt = PEt + it Dt - Tt                                                                                                                                                         (3) 
 
Where Bt,  PEt , it Dt and Tt  are new public borrowing, public expenditure, interest payments 
on the outstanding stock of debt and tax revenue respectively. If fiscal sustainability is 
defined as a path to keep new borrowing to be kept to the following condition; 
  
Bt = Dt yt    where yt is the growth rate of nominal GDP. 
 
Then the long run budget constraint is: 
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Dt yt = PEt - Tt + it Dt     or (it - yt) Dt = Tt - PEt 
 
Using real interest rate (rt) and real growth rate (gt), it can be expressed as: 
 
(rt - gt) Dt = Tt - PE 
 
Then, the change in public debt to GDP (dt ) is: 
 
ttt
t
t
t dgr
GDP
defecitprimary
d )(                                                                          (4) 
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